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ABSTRACT 
The mounting evidence of anthropogenic climate change in the past 30 years has 
beckoned the social sciences to illuminate and address the complex phenomena 
underlying actions that impact the environment. While many studies have considered 
salient indicators of pro-environmental behavior (PEB) in the United States, little 
research has assessed how economic ideologies influence such behaviors at the individual 
level. Accordingly, this study develops and tests a sociological augmentation of the 
Theory of Planned Behavior in an effort to understand how neoliberal market ideology 
impacts the frequency and likelihood of behaviors that benefit the environment. Using 
data from the 2010 General Social Survey and the Environment III module of the 
International Social Survey Program (N=1430), the impacts of market-fundamentalist 
endorsements are tested using hierarchical regression techniques on a variety of 
environmentally significant behavioral outcomes. Results indicate that neoliberalism 
overall plays a significant and often negative role in individual pro-environmental 
behavior, which empirically challenges the assertion that markets can simultaneously 
self-regulate and address environmental degradation. Insights for future research, 
theoretical synthesis, and public policy are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 “The best time to plant a tree is twenty years ago. The second best time is now.” 
The relevance of this well-known Chinese proverb is uncanny when considering the 
current crises of global warming. It is pertinent, because we as a species have indeed 
lapsed in our abilities to recognize the dire trajectories upon which we have placed 
ourselves, and we must accept that all we have left is the second best time to act, and 
fast—indeed, there may be no third. The proverb is also literal, because it speaks to one 
of nature's primary mechanisms for removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, which 
is in fact our current, self-made dilemma. Alas, it is even somewhat ironic, in that its 
country of origin is now one of the primary contributors to the greenhouse gases that are 
destroying the inhabitability of the planet. 
 To be sure, the time to act is now, and the time is right. With the outcry of united 
voices around the world, over 300,000 participants in the Peoples Climate March issued a 
resounding thunderclap in anticipation of literal ones, mounting the dangers and dialogue 
of climate change on an international stage in the biggest climate-based march in history 
(Goodman & Gonzalez, 2014a). Yet, the increasing trend of collective climate concern 
has been met continuously with a combination of deliberate denial, lip service, and 
disregard for over three decades (Klein, 2014). In the cognitive dissonance of profit, 
power, and progress, political leadership in the U.S. and abroad has balked at the warning 
signs and been led by the “invisible hand” of market fundamentalism down the road of 
neoliberalism, which has transformed the political, cultural, and literal landscape of the 
world for the worse (Harvey, 2005). Unfortunately, this dogma of unfettered 
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development has only amplified the insatiable growth fetish of the dominant American 
paradigm, and neoliberalism is now a cornerstone of most Americans' worldviews, “to 
the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us 
interpret, live in, and understand the world” (Harvey, 2005, p. 3). But as Bill McKibben, 
outspoken climate activist and founder of 350.org has stated, “In the world we grew up 
in, our most ingrained economic and political habit was growth; it's the reflex we're going 
to have to temper, and it's going to be tough” (2010, p. 47). Indeed, it appears that the 
current moment may be the precise point in which this tempering will occur, while both 
tempers and temperatures flare. 
The purpose of this thesis is to capitalize on that moment by asking a very 
important question: how does neoliberal ideology impact individuals' engagement in pro-
environmental behaviors (PEB)? Using Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior, 
Martin Patchen's (2010) theoretical framework of environmentally significant behavior 
(ESBF), and multiple sociological critiques of neoliberalism, this study quantitatively 
assesses indicators of neoliberal beliefs on a variety of specific pro-environmental 
behaviors. These behaviors are recognized by Stern (2000) as representing a gradation of 
activities related to environmental benefit, including: car use, water and energy 
conservation, recycling and green purchasing activities, support for higher prices and 
taxes, and financial and signature contributions. The analysis is done through the use of 
hierarchical regression techniques using the 2010 General Social Survey, based on a 
pragmatic theoretical adaptation of Ajzen’s original model (1991). 
 The assertion of the current study is that the institutional framework of 
neoliberalism plays an important role in the recognition and mitigation of environmental 
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issues. It is hypothesized here that beliefs which support unchecked growth are likely 
connected to a deficit in pro-environmental behaviors. In this effort, the current 
investigation serves to empirically legitimize what is intuitively obvious. By doing so, 
this study bridges a gap in the literature between sociological, institutional analyses 
(which are critical of neoliberal trends) and social-psychological, individual analyses 
(which leave such institutional concerns largely unaddressed). Ultimately, the goal is to 
merge context with agency in both empirical observation and theoretical synthesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The mounting evidence of anthropogenic climate change in the past 30 years has 
beckoned the social sciences to illuminate and address the complex phenomena 
underlying actions that impact the environment—for if certain types of human behavior 
cause climate change, what causes those behaviors? To begin this analysis, some space 
must be given to establishing the problem of climate change from a physical science basis 
and to generating an understanding of the importance of the project at hand. To be sure, a 
basic and operational understanding of climate change is sufficient for contextualizing 
the current project. There are three basic ideas about global warming which one must 
have: what is happening, why it is happening, and what to do about it. While the current 
endeavor is predominantly aimed at addressing the last of these, what follows is a brief 
introduction to the first two, to provide a cursory understanding of climate change and to 
convey the immediacy of the current research. 
Evidence of Climate Change 
 The fundamental fact of global warming is the phenomenon of the greenhouse 
effect. This is the process by which (a) the sun's energy is transmitted to the earth in 
visible light, (b) the earth reflects heat back toward space in the infrared spectrum, and 
(c) certain types of gases in the atmosphere (specifically carbon dioxide) capture the 
infrared light and bounce it back toward the earth (Kolbert, 2007). The greenhouse-effect 
has been observed, studied, and verified for over 150 years, from the early work of John 
Tyndall to the most recent reports of NASA's Goddard Institute; as Kolbert (2007) put it, 
“it is not remotely controversial; indeed, it's recognized as an essential condition of life 
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on the planet” (p. 37).  Under ‘normal’ conditions, the greenhouse gases (GHG) in the 
atmosphere keep the earth at a relatively stable temperature for long periods of time 
(around 57 degrees Fahrenheit)—if they did not, the earth's surface would freeze—but 
the effect is scalable; that is, the more greenhouse gases like CO2 are released into the 
atmosphere, the more infrared heat is trapped. This is what is meant by global warming: 
the increased greenhouse gases trap more heat, and result in an increasing global 
temperature (IPCC, 2014; Kolbert, 2007; McKibben, 2010). 
 The primary authority on climate change research and evidence is the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was established in 
1988 “to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge 
in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts” (IPCC, 
2014c). Analyzing thousands of research findings from multiple sources, the IPCC has 
continued to generate periodic Assessment Reports (AR)—approximately every five to 
seven years since 1990—which summarize and organize the key findings in climate 
science research, and condense the findings in Summary Reports for Policy Makers 
(Union of Concerned Scientists, 2014). The most recent round of reports, the AR5, was 
completed in 2014, consisting of documents outlining the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change, the ramifications for humans and ecologies, and mitigation strategies 
(IPCC, 2013; IPCC, 2014a; IPCC 2014b). 
To measure greenhouse gases, the unit of Parts Per Million (ppm) is commonly 
used, which is the fractional amount of a contaminant within 1 million divisible parts of a 
material of interest (IPCC, 2014; Kolbert, 2007). The term Gigatons of CO2 or Its 
Equivalents (GtCO2eq) is also used. The first measurement of CO2 in ppm took place in 
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1959 at the Mauna Loa observatory in Hawaii, with a value of 316 ppm (Kolbert, 2007). 
This number has increased rapidly since, oscillating with minor seasonal fluctuations in 
its continual steady rise. At the time of writing, the current CO2 concentration in the 
earth's atmosphere is 399.01 ppm, though it breached the 400 ppm mark earlier in 2014, 
following seasonal oscillation patterns (NOAA, 2014). This increase in CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere has been coupled with a consistent rise in average global 
air temperatures, which has been corroborated in analysis of permafrost drill samples in 
Alaska, which do not vary in the way air temperatures do (Kolbert, 2007). As stated by 
the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), “Mitigation scenarios in which 
it is likely that the temperature change caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions can be 
kept to less than 2 degrees Celsius relative to pre-industrial levels are characterized by 
atmospheric concentrations in 2100 of about 450 ppm CO2eq” (2014, p. 10). This goal to 
stay under 450 ppm carbon dioxide or its greenhouse equivalents by 2100 is obviously 
lofty, given that in the past 50 years the CO2 concentration has risen 80 ppm, or nearly 
double the concentration in nearly half the time. However, in his book on current 
disasters resulting from climate change, McKibben (2010) noted that this goal is actually 
somewhat conservative as a measure of safe levels of greenhouse gas concentration, and 
that some researchers such as James Hansen, the former director of NASA's Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies, believe “the safe number was, at most, 350 ppm” (p. 15). 
 But the issue of rising global temperatures isn't simply a matter of 'turning off' the 
greenhouse gases. The rising temperature is inexorably linked to various climate 
feedback systems that exacerbate global warming (Kolbert, 2007). One of these is the 
ice-albedo feedback loop, in which rising temperatures melt highly reflective snow and 
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replace it with highly absorptive ocean water, which rises the temperature of the oceans 
and further melts snow and ice (Kolbert, 2007, p. 31). Another is the ice-sheet melt 
feedback observed in Greenland, whereby a melting ice sheet, impacted by rising global 
temperatures, begins to flow faster and thin out, causing it to melt more quickly (Kolbert, 
2007, p. 54). These, and other feedback systems, are what make the issue of climate 
change so complex, because they are instigated by increased GHG, but then themselves 
contribute to rising temperatures. It is as if we as the human species have set in motion 
many tiny snowballs rolling down the inclines of alarming growth charts, waiting until 
they grow in intensity to recognize the resultant, uncontrollable deluge. Unfortunately, 
increasing snow is not the problem. 
 Another crucial phenomenon in the concerns of global warming is the 
thermohaline circulation process. This is the conveyor belt of sinking salt water in the 
arctic which draws tropical warm water toward the poles, generating weather patterns 
around the globe (Kolbert, 2007). By increasing global temperatures, warming the 
oceans, and melting fresh water out of glacial reserves, we effectively expand the tropic 
regions, and consequently alter the patterns of the weather (Kolbert, 2007). This is the 
reason that some areas are seeing intense cold despite the globe actually “warming.” The 
warming does not manifest in all places becoming proportionally hotter, but in a warmer 
globe that changes where the hot and cold places are, as well as how extreme they get. 
Indeed, the tropics have expanded by two degrees latitude in the past 30 years, forcing 
rain patterns in Australia to shift southward into the ocean: “they are trying to avoid the 
term drought because it implies the condition may someday end” (McKibben, 2010, p. 
5). 
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 To understand these phenomena, scientists use a variety of complex measurement 
processes—such as ice-core analysis and remote sensing—which produce data that 
inform advanced climate modeling (Kolbert, 2007). As Kolbert (2007) states, “there are 
two types of equations that go into a climate model. The first group expresses 
fundamental physical principles, like the conservation of energy and the law of gravity. 
The second group describes...patterns and interactions that have been observed in nature” 
(p. 103). By coding these parameters into models like the one used by the Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies, scientists can run models on past weather events to see how 
accurately they perform, and then run projections into the future to see how the globe will 
respond to different levels of greenhouse gases and feedback loops (Kolbert, 2007; 
McKibben, 2010). This kind of modeling serves as the basis for CO2 concentration 
targets like those set by the IPCC—450 ppm CO2eq by 2100—because it generates 
different scenarios (contingent on comprehensive action plans known as 'mitigation 
strategies') in which greenhouse gas emissions create 'points of no return' for inhabiting 
the earth (IPCC, 2014b). And the time frame of these issues is critical. Most projections 
are based around targets set for 2100 and interim targets for 2050—within the next 86 
years (IPCC, 2014b). This underscores an integral trait of global warming, for it is neither 
a sudden crash of immediately recognizable events, nor a distant prospect for our great 
grandchildren: it is an escalating issue which begins slowly and quietly amidst the 
random variability of normal weather fluctuation, and then amplifies through feedback 
systems and continued emission concentration into catastrophic consequences for life on 
earth. In fact, it was precisely this kind of warning that James Hansen issued in the 1980s, 
already 99 percent confident that global warming was beginning to take effect (Kolbert, 
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2007). As McKibben (2010) put it: “Forget the grandkids; it turns out this was a problem 
for our parents” (p. 16). 
 Indeed, the effects of global warming are already observable; the volume is 
turning up, and with it the level of the sea. The rising tides caused by warm-water 
expansion and ice melt have forced people to abandon their homes across the globe, from 
Shimsharef, Alaska, to Miami Beach, Florida, despite political hand wringing (Kolbert, 
2007; Mishak, 2014). The Dutch have created new houses with built-in floatation to 
anticipate flooding (Kolbert, 2007), and the president of the Maldives announced a 
budget plan to “relocate the population to Sri Lanka or Australia before the ocean finally 
rose too high for its survival” (McKibben, 2010, p. 37). But sea levels are not the only 
rising concern. The increasing temperatures have expanded the inhabitable regions of 
various species of mosquito, and made it easier for them to overwinter in their existing 
ecosystems (Kolbert, 2007; McKibben, 2010). Massive outbreaks of dengue fever and 
malaria have literally swarmed developing countries, costing the global economy billions 
of dollars, and the global ecology millions of lives (Kolbert, 2007; McKibben, 2010). But 
other creatures have not and will not fare as well: the current epoch has given way to 
extreme losses in global biodiversity (Kolbert, 2007, Veron, 2008). With the spread of 
wild fires, the acidification and warming of the oceans, drought, disease, diminishing 
food supply, and debilitating storm surges, global warming is the harbinger of literally 
grave consequences for nearly all life forms on earth, and this is just the tip of the 
diminishing iceberg (Kolbert, 2007; McKibben, 2010). 
 The scope of this kind of wide-scale death has only occurred five times before on 
the planet, during what are called mass extinction events: “characterized by fundamental 
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changes in plant and animal diversity as many high-level taxonomic groups go extinct 
over the same geological time interval” (Veron, 2008, p. 460). In a study based around 
fossil records in coral reefs, Veron (2008) conducted a review of causal theories for mass 
extinction events and assessed their implications with global carbon cycles, after which 
he concluded: 
...primary causes of mass extinctions are linked in various ways to the carbon 
cycle in general and ocean chemistry in particular with clear association with 
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. The prospect of ocean acidification is 
potentially the most serious of all predicted outcomes of anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide increase. This study concludes that acidification has the potential to 
trigger a sixth mass extinction event and to do so independently of anthropogenic 
extinctions that are currently taking place. (Veron, 2008, p. 459). 
Accordingly, this has caused a shift in how geological science has come to be studied, 
and, to use a term coined by Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen, we can now think of the 
current epoch as the anthropocene, which “suggests that the Earth has now left its natural 
geological epoch.... Human activities have become so pervasive and profound that they 
rival the great forces of nature and are pushing the Earth,” (Steffen, Crutzen, & McNeill, 
2007). Crutzen identified the anthropocene as beginning with the Industrial Revolution in 
the 1800s, which served as the catalyst for large scale, human-caused CO2 release, 
primarily through the burning of fossil fuels. 
 This term is used to account for the climate changes in the current time period—
“anthro” connoting humans, and “genic” connoting a generation of phenomena—that is, 
“human caused.” Indeed, climate change events have occurred in the past before women 
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and men walked the earth, but this specific event—the rise of GHGs in the past 200 years 
and their effects—is not just a human reaction to a natural occurrence, but a natural 
reaction to a human occurrence (Kolbert, 2007; McKibben, 2010). The Vostok Ice cores 
taken in 1999 show the transitions of temperature and CO2 level over the past 800,000 
years, and it is clear: since the industrial revolution and the advent of fossil fuel emissions 
on a mass scale, the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere has accelerated and exceeded 
beyond any previous point in measurable geodesic history, and the global temperature 
has broken records set as far back at 400,000 years ago (IPCC, 2013; Kolbert, 2007). The 
evidence is irrefutable, and only continues to increase, as data on emissions have shown: 
“Annual anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased by 10 GtCO2eq between 2000 
and 2010, with this increase directly coming from energy supply (47%), industry (30%), 
transport (11%) and buildings (3%) sectors” (IPCC, 2014b, p. 8). By recognizing this 
causal role of human activity in climate change, it subsequently becomes possible to 
conduct an analysis of the causes of that activity.  
Critiques of Neoliberalism 
 Despite the overwhelming scientific evidence, a rampant denial of the 
anthropogenic causes of climate change and an obfuscation of the systemic processes that 
facilitate them have gained a significant foothold in the past thirty years—especially in 
the United States—a denial founded in cultural and ideological shifts, and an obfuscation 
manifested in economic and national policy changes (McKibben, 2010). Accordingly, a 
sociological analysis of those systemic processes is necessary, as they relate to the 
concept of neoliberalism. In his book, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey 
states: 
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Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The 
role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate 
to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and 
integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defense, police, and legal 
structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to 
guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets.... But beyond 
these tasks the state should not venture...because, according to the theory, the 
state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals 
(prices). (2005, p. 2, italics added) 
Similarly, Mudge (2008) highlights that neoliberalism as an ideology can be understood 
as an historical development fueled by the interplay between intellectual, bureaucratic, 
and political institutions in the West throughout the twentieth century, all of which hinge 
“on a single, fundamental principle: the superiority of individualized, market-based 
competition over other modes of organization” (p. 706). Intellectually, neoliberalism has 
come to assert a kind of market fundamentalism, i.e. that fluctuations in economic 
exchange systems serve as the basis for how other institutions should be arranged, and 
that this basis is unquestionable. Bureaucratically, neoliberalism asserts austerity policies 
and free market efforts that undercut the state’s socially liberal policies. In the political 
sphere, it places “the market” above reproach by evoking intellectual neoliberal economic 
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theory and effecting bureaucratic neoliberal policies that re-center political discourse on 
key assumptions about free-trade superiority. 
For the purposes of the current study, then, neoliberalism is defined as an 
institutional framework and ideological 1 perspective that supports market and trade 
freedoms; limits government spending, regulation, and organization in favor of laissez 
faire policies; asserts austerity measures; and focuses on economic growth as the 
primary means and measure of success.  
Tracing the development of this economic perspective, it was in the works of 
Friedrich von Hayek, an Austrian political philosopher, that the origins of neoliberalism 
started, which hinged on the deregulation of markets to preserve economic freedom 
(Harvey, 2005; Mudge, 2008). Drawing on the economic liberalism advanced by Adam 
Smith in the 18th Century, Hayek and others2 reinvigorated the theories of market 
superiority and deregulation in response to the Keynesian interventionism, state planning, 
and socialism that had begun to take hold in global political discourse (Harvey, 2005, p. 
21). Hayek authored a collection of books, including The Road to Serfdom, and founded 
the Mount Pelerin Society in 1947, which emphasized a resurgence of liberal economics 
and rallied economists and philosophers dedicated to free market thinking. Though 
marginalized during much of the twentieth century, Hayek's philosophy gained 
momentum throughout the 1970s as a response to the stagflation, political crises, and 
economic downturn of that decade (Mudge, 2008). In the academic sphere, neoliberalism 
was advanced by Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger at the University of Chicago, 
again in response to Keynesian economics and the “embedded” liberalism of the post-war 
era which placed constraints on markets for the purposes of stability after the Great 
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Depression (Harvey, 2005). But as Coleman (2013) notes, this resurgence of economic 
liberalism was not the only new thing about neoliberalism. Coleman identifies two 
specific shifts the neoliberals made that broke away from the economics of Locke, Smith, 
and Mill: first, a transition in the conceptualization of freedom that replaced manipulative 
constraints with chosen constraints, effectively placing individual choice at the center of 
the definition of freedom (2013). Second, rather than solely asserting the supremacy of 
market forces, “neoliberals’ contribution was to shift the burden of the case for liberalism 
from market success to government failure” (2013, p. 87, italics original). Given the 
substantial critiques of market idealism due to the Great Depression, it was not enough to 
echo the classical claim of liberal economics that markets could self-regulate and, by way 
of Smith’s ‘invisible hand,’ effect the goods of society. Instead, neoliberal intellectuals 
advanced the position that governments had failed to establish better conditions for 
facilitating wealth, personal choice, and economic exchange using a mixture of two 
explanations: first, governments were viewed as sites of exploitation that siphoned off the 
wealth—and therefore, freedom—of individuals (Coleman, 2013). Second, neoliberals 
argued that government had no contractual obligation to the public to ensure the latter’s 
interest, and therefore the government could not be expected to commit to the freedom, 
wealth, and choice of the people, and instead could be suspected to deceive the public 
toward projects only tangential to their interests (Coleman, 2013). 
This intellectual reinvigoration and adaptation of economic liberalism was 
manifested in a collaborative economic development program in Chile under a group of 
Friedman’s students (known as the “Chicago Boys”) who played an instrumental role in 
the transformation of Chile’s economic system into the exemplar of neoliberal policy 
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after the Pinochet Coup of 1973 (Brender, 2010). Subsequently, this implementation of 
neoliberal policy gave empirical credence to neoliberalism as a system of organization 
and served as a foundation for its widespread assertion in intellectual spheres (Mudge, 
2008). Neoliberalism as a political agenda culminated in the United States when Ronald 
Reagan, echoing the claim of government failure, stated in his inaugural speech that 
“government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem” (Lillian 
Goldman Law Library, 2014). Subsequently, Reagan executed his promise of economic 
growth through the measures that had been recently empirically validated by the Pinochet 
Coup: a collection of tax and budget cuts, battles with labor organizations, and sweeping 
austerity measures in social welfare programs (including the EPA). These were mirrored 
by the administration of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, and all served as the 
catalyst for a trend toward neoliberal legitimacy in an increasingly global political sphere 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 25). 
In addition, an important campaigning component advanced neoliberalism on the 
cultural and political stage: a collection of privately funded organizations including the 
Fraser Institute, the Atlas Economic research Foundation, the CATO Institute, the 
Heritage Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute—all of which paved the way 
for deregulation in prospective markets and the subsequent financialization of the global 
economy (Harvey, 2005; Mudge, 2008). These organizations have played a key role in 
the dissemination of neoliberal thinking in both Europe and the U.S., and that role has 
been primarily tied to effecting market-favorable policies by cultivating relationships 
between corporate interests and political and state leaders (Mudge, 2008, p. 713). 
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But the key shift in the public sphere came from the Republican Party's ability to 
“mobilize its popular base to vote against its material interest on cultural/religious 
grounds” (Harvey, 2005, p. 51). As Harvey notes, the combination of evangelical social 
aspirations (such as Jerry Falwell's moral majority), an appeal to white working class 
males, and a collection of neoconservative figureheads merged into an “unholy alliance 
between big business and conservative Christians” which solidified the party's 
constituency around a neoliberal platform while simultaneously funding its moral crusade 
(2005, p. 50). By using massive amounts of wealth and power, neoliberal corporate and 
political actors could disseminate both moral and economic perspectives across the 
country, transforming how the public would come to understand the concepts of labor, 
finance, health care, environment, and even the concept of “liberalism.” To address the 
last of these, Antonio (2013) conceptually rectified the discrepant use of the word 
“liberal” by separating it into the terms social liberalism— following the late American 
usage in which regulation of markets, increases in governmental social welfare programs, 
and the rise of the middle class prevail—and market liberalism—following the traditional 
European meaning, in which free markets, cuts in government spending and organization, 
and austerity measures dominate. 
 However, while the history of neoliberalism in the United States is inexorably tied 
to the transformation of the Republican Party and the conservative right, the former 
should not be conflated with the latter two: neoliberalism is not necessarily a 
“Republican” or “conservative” ideology, but an increasingly ubiquitous institutional 
worldview. Indeed, as Mudge (2008) notes, the social sciences have often ignored the 
adherence to market fundamentalism among center-left political agents in the U.S. and 
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Europe, which has undermined the systematic analysis of the totality of neoliberalism. As 
an example, the Clinton administration “fell directly into the neoliberal fold of policy 
prescription and implementation,” as signaled by the signing of the North Atlantic Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Harvey, 2005, p. 51). Moreover, in the political changes 
occurring in the far right throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many U.S. Democratic leaders 
started shifting their base toward market-friendly politics out of the fear of losing their 
political base (Harvey, 2005). Indeed, by the 2008 recession, market-fundamentalist 
perspectives had become a staple of the American political discourse on both sides of the 
aisle. Accordingly, in the current study, neoliberal ideology is not used to signal one half 
of a traditional left-right distinction, but is considered across political divisions in an 
effort to more accurately expose distinctions from the “top-down.” 
 With respect to the anthropocene, neoliberalism has played an especially 
dangerous role. While the Industrial Revolution and rise of capitalism certainly spurred 
anthropogenic climate change, it is the philosophical trajectory of neoliberalism which 
serves as the most substantial inhibitor of climate action, because the philosophy itself 
undercuts the necessary mechanisms for systemic change. To be sure, neoliberalism’s 
placement of markets above political and bureaucratic regulation undermines the scrutiny 
of the market’s environmental impacts. As Antonio notes,  
Denial of anthropogenic climate change has been nearly a Republican Party 
doctrine. Conservatives charge that environmental regulation stems growth, kills 
jobs and violates property rights; they call for Environmental Protection Agency 
shutdown. … That pseudoscientific and antiscientific propaganda, paid for by 
wealthy corporate and individual sponsors, often has been granted parity with 
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science in media reportage and has too often dominated congressional and public 
conversation about climate and environment manifests neoliberalism’s 
deployment of concentrated wealth and power to serve immoderate ends. (2013, 
p. 34.) 
Though Antonio specifically recognizes the climate denial of the Republican Party as 
stemming from neoliberalism, it is additionally telling that center-left Democrats have 
tended to acquiesce to this trend. Indeed, it is striking to note that the evidence of climate 
change emerged in tandem with the rise of neoliberalism in the United States, because the 
former has increasingly beckoned socially liberal reforms while the latter has pushed 
market-liberal policies. Neoliberalism as a philosophical perspective is hinged on 
property, money, deregulation, and free economic exchange and the intentional distrust of 
governmental intervention; despite the supposed superiority of markets and the promise 
of “green neoliberalism,” much empirical evidence has shown that neoliberal policy has 
cultivated no room for incorporating environmental concern into its bottom line, and no 
tolerance for governmental regulations which require its businesses to do so (Enoch, 
2007). Neoliberalism, therefore, is theoretically doomed to fail as a solution to 
environmental and climate issues, and its institutional framework must be scrutinized 
seriously in order to stave off dire consequences for the planet. 
 Unfortunately, in the battle between capitalism and the climate, the former has 
dominated, shaping the mainstream reaction to global warming—a denial on the level of 
cultural cognitive dissonance, 3 tailored to the interests of the capitalist class (especially 
the fossil fuel industry), meticulously calculated and disseminated by conservative think 
tanks, amplified through political loudspeakers, and reflected in both public policy and 
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public opinion (Klein, 2014; Kolbert, 2007; McKibben, 2010). Organizations like the 
Heritage Foundation, the CATO Institute, and the Koch brothers' Americans for 
Prosperity and American Legislative Council (all key players in the neoliberal transition 
previously mentioned), have actively worked to vilify climate scientists and 
environmental advocates, repudiate legitimate climate science, and foster a national 
climate skepticism for political ends (Antonio, 2013; Klein, 2014; Kolbert, 2007; Markle, 
2014; McKibben, 2010). 
 However, the most damaging aspect of the pervasiveness of neoliberalism is that 
it undercuts any legitimate effort to stop climate change by framing growth at all costs as 
“a necessary, even wholly 'natural', way for the social order to be regulated” (Harvey, 
2005, p. 41). Business leaders, politicians, and citizens alike echo the toxic rhetoric of 
progress and economic expansion as both the solutions to global warming and the litmus 
test for feasible strategies to stop it. As recently as the 2014 COP 20 Summit in Lima, 
Peru, political leaders in the developed world have continued to soft-ball myopic 
benchmarks and platitudes recognized by climate scientists and activists as wholly 
insufficient; much of the discourse is directed at change on an individual level and using 
developing countries as scapegoats for failed policy adoption (Goodman & Gonzalez, 
2014b). This has led to what Haq and Toulin call the “third era” of climate change, in 
which “one group of people (namely rich people everywhere, but mostly in rich 
countries) have caused the problem, and another group of people (namely poor people 
especially in poor countries) will suffer most of the adverse consequences, in the near 
term” (2006, p. 2). This third era is characterized by an emphasis on the individual as 
both the cause and solution of global warming, and is reflective of a larger, more 
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pervasive neoliberal ideology. Accordingly, this politicization and focus on the individual 
as the center of mitigation—combined with the cultivated rejection of government ‘as the 
problem’—has forced the understanding of and reactions to climate change to be seen 
through the capitalistic lenses of free-market trends, austerity, diluted avenues for real 
change, and individual responsibility (Klein, 2014). In reaction to the individualist 
environmentalism of the current era, Klein has argued that we must  
…move the ideological pole far away from the stifling market fundamentalism 
that has become the greatest enemy to planetary health…. For a quarter of a 
century, we have tried the approach of polite incremental change, attempting to 
bend the physical needs of the planet to our economic model’s need for constant 
growth and new profit-making opportunities. The results have been disastrous, 
leaving us all in a great deal more danger than when the experiment began. (2014, 
p. 26). 
 Tracing the effect of this third era, Markle (2014) has shown through qualitative 
analysis how the neoliberal, individualized framing of climate change mitigation stems 
substantive change at the individual level, through excuses, accounts, and minor behavior 
changes that assuage the compelling call to act for the environment. As Markle states: 
The American culture of environmentalism is shaped by three interest groups: 
political, corporate and environmental; and is embedded within the national 
ideology of individualism. Political and corporate interests tend to align with one 
another and conflict with core environmental interests, resulting in a culture of 
environmentalism that is individualized and consumer based. (2014, p. 249). 
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 What emerges here is an ideology that has gained political power and permeated 
American culture, founded on a philosophy which is fundamentally opposed to its own 
sustainability. Such an ideology opposes meaningful climate action on all levels that 
would make a necessary difference in the face of climate projections—namely public 
actions coordinated by government policy—steadily narrowing the frame in which 
environmental problems, environmental solutions, and environmentalism may be viewed. 
Most detrimentally, it obfuscates structural problems by turning the spotlight on ordinary 
citizens to shoulder the responsibility of sustainability, mitigation, and adaptation, in 
what one might call neoliberal environmentalism. By this I mean that neoliberal ideology 
restricts institutional, regulatory, and figurational action in favor of the supposed 
superiority of businesses and the “demand” of consumers. This individualistic approach 
to environmental activity calls on citizens to vote green by buying green: to replace their 
light bulbs, recycle their waste, and reuse shopping bags without significantly reducing 
their consumption, making significant lifestyle changes, or considering an alternative 
framework to a model of growth. This echoes the view by Gershon (2011) that this 
ideology has effected at the individual level a neoliberal agency: “a neoliberal vision of 
people owning themselves as though they were a business” (p. 539). Gershon asserts that 
all social operators—people, governments, businesses—are defined and socially 
constructed by neoliberalism, and where economic liberalism viewed the self as an owner 
of the body and the ability to work (effectively, as property), a neoliberal agency 
construes the actor as a personal project, a collection of skills for improvement, to be 
capitalized upon (2014, p. 539). As she states: 
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…neoliberal agency emerges as conscious choices that balance alliances, 
responsibility, and risk using a means-ends calculus. The freedom that 
neoliberalism provides is to be an autonomous agent negotiating for goods and 
services in a context where every other agent should ideally be also acting like a 
business partner or competitor. (Gershon, 2014, p. 540).  
Through this sense of agency, neoliberal environmentalism situates the individual 
at the center of environmental action, and places all other scales of activity outside the 
realm of permissible or trustworthy discourse. As such, it is imperative that this 
neoliberal environmentalism and the ideology on which it stands be empirically tackled 
in two ways: first, by demanding an analysis of the structural and institutional forces at 
work by key propagators of neoliberal rhetoric, which has seen an increasing surge in 
recent research (Antonio, 2013; Klein, 2014; Mudge, 2008). Second, by investigating 
how such an ideology actually influences individuals’ engagement in environmental 
action, to illuminate whether a neoliberal ideology actually fosters or hinders pro-
environmental behavior—the focus of the current project. 
 To this end, the empirical literature tracing the connection between neoliberalism 
and environmental degradation has taken various forms across multiple disciplines, 
conceptualizing both in divergent ways (Bakker, 2010). Predominantly, the study of the 
impact of neoliberalism on environmental issues often circles around the failures of 
localized or national policies at benefiting the environment, or as context for framing 
conflicts of natural resources. Unfortunately, in an extensive literature review, the author 
could find no studies which have undertaken the quantitative analysis of the relationship 
of neoliberalism and individual environmental behavior in the field of sociology. Though 
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the work of Cordano, Frieze, and Ellis (2004) did look at the impact of attitudes about 
property rights and regulation on a variety of PEB intentions, it did not theoretically 
organize these attitudes as indicative of an underlying neoliberal ideology, nor did it 
address the historical context of such attitudes. Similarly, the work of Coffey and Joseph 
(2013) assessed the significance and impacts of political views and ideology on different 
pro-environmental behaviors, but their conceptualization of ideology was ambiguous, did 
not draw upon literature about neoliberal economic perspectives, and mirrored the 
division between democrats and republicans in U.S. politics. As neoliberalism is involved 
in shaping the cultural context in which environmental behavior may be understood, it 
becomes imperative to expose this link: tracing the institutional social factors of 
neoliberalism in the study of individual reactions to climate change, accounting for both 
agency and context at the individual level of analysis. To approach this goal, the current 
study turns to a review of social psychological literature, mapping out both the 
illuminating findings behind individuals actions, as well as the shortcomings of an 
isolated framework devoid of a critical institutional theory. 
Pro-Environmental Behaviors 
To understand what kinds of behaviors benefit the environment, a careful analysis 
of behavior conceptualization and impact is crucial. The predominant conceptualizations 
of pro-environmental behavior as a dependent variable in existing research fall into two 
primary categories. First, PEB is represented through self-reported behaviors (Bamberg 
& Schmidt, 2003; Coffey & Joseph, 2013; Joireman, Van Lange, & Van Vugt, 2004; Liu 
& Sibley, 2012; Norgaard, 2006; Scannell & Gifford, 2013; Scherbaum, Popovich, & 
Finlinson, 2008; Starr, 2009; Wall, Devine-Wright, & Mill, 2007). Second, it is 
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represented through self-reported intentions of behaviors (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; 
Coffey & Joseph, 2013; Cordano, Welcomer, Scherer, Pradenas, & Parada, 2011; Liu & 
Sibley, 2012; Scherbaum et al., 2008; Wall et al., 2007). It should be noted that in some 
cases intentions are also identified as independent variables acting upon actual behaviors, 
in accordance with models that identify intention as a mediating construct on behavior 
(Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Wall et al., 2007). 
Subsequently, pro-environmental behaviors and intentions are operationalized on 
a variety of activities related to the environment. These include transportation modes 
(Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Joireman et al., 2004; Wall et al., 2007), conservation 
activities (Coffey & Joseph, 2013; Scherbaum, Popovich, & Finlinson, 2008), personal 
sacrifices (Liu & Sibley, 2012; Scannell & Gifford, 2013), recycling (Coffey & Joseph, 
2013), consumption practices (Starr, 2009) and different forms of civic environmentalism 
such as social movement support (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). Indeed, 
one study by Armel, Yan, Todd, and Robinson (2011) identified ten indices of pro-
environmental behavior on the Stanford Climate Change Behavior Survey, ranging from 
food packaging to energy use. In rarer instances, actual emissions data may be linked to 
individual pro-environmental behavior, but this is an exception within the literature (Liu 
& Sibley, 2012). 
From these operational definitions, it becomes clear that PEBs exhibit a gradation. 
As Stern (2000) noted, PEBs tend to fall on different spectra between direct, low-impact, 
private-sphere actions (such as recycling, conserving home energy, and buying green 
products) and indirect, high-impact, public-sphere actions (environmental citizenship, 
policy support and reform, and signing petitions). As such, different pro-environmental 
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behaviors exhibit different amounts of sacrifice, energy, commitment, behavior change, 
and ultimately, impact for the environment. These varying degrees exemplify the difficult 
fact that not all pro-environmental behaviors are created equal, and they complicate the 
measurement and comparison of each behavioral outcome. 
To organize this wide array of measurement of pro-environmental behavior, 
Markle (2013) asserted that the construct of “pro-environmental behavior” inherently 
begs the question of the degree to which the behavior actually benefits the environment. 
Indeed, some researchers have used variables such as elevator usage and hours of 
television viewed (Armel et al., 2011) as proxies for PEB, which Markle has called into 
question as being legitimate, environmentally significant actions with a direct impact on 
the environment (2013). To be sure, there are behaviors which one may think benefit the 
environment, and others that more significantly do so. Starting from evidence in physical 
science regarding the most detrimental causes of global warming and degradation, 
Markle (2013) created the Pro-Environmental Behavior Scale (PEBS) to standardize the 
PEB construct along the three most beneficial forms of environmental behavior at the 
individual level: transportation mode, conservation practices, and civic 
environmentalism. This focus echoes the recent IPCC reports showing that annual 
anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions are generated predominantly in the energy, 
industry, and transport sectors (IPCC, 2014b). Theoretically, this approach organizes the 
conceptualization of PEB in parallel spectra: first, it underscores an important emphasis 
on highlighting, promoting, and studying significant actions for the environment against 
insignificant proxies. Second, it links individual behaviors to systemic and institutional 
problems that endanger the planet’s biodiversity.   
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Crucially, then, pro-environmental behavior research and its programmatic 
implementations must be oriented at the onset toward things which have the most impact 
on the environment. Any research program regarding PEB must assess the behavioral 
outcome of interest for its significance in both (a) decreasing pollution, waste, and 
emissions in the environment, and (b) contributing to an institutional shift toward 
sustainability. 
Social-Psychological Models of PEB 
To make sense of what encourages behavior beneficial to the environment, many 
indicators 4 have been tested through experimentation and empirical study, and these 
determinants are organized and explained by statistically modeled theories. Importantly, 
each PEB is a separate, multivariate issue, impacted by a variety of independent and 
mediating variables, and it is therefore often useful to articulate impacts in terms of 
widely tested models rather than single variables. As such, a variety of theoretical models 
have been posited within the social-psychological literature in recent decades, and six 
core models have emerged as predominant front-runners in the study of the PEB. They 
are presented in Figure 1 below. 5 Their respective indicators are discussed here in an 
effort to shed light on trends within the literature, specifically regarding a lack of 
institutional considerations. The indicators are italicized below for the purposes of clarity. 
First, theoretical frameworks proposed by Ajzen, such as the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
(Ajzen, 1991) have been used widely to frame PEB (Cordano et al., 2011; Steg, 2005; 
Wall et al., 2007). The theory of reasoned action asserts that beliefs about environmental 
behaviors influence a person’s attitude toward that behavior, and that social motivations 
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and pressures influence subjective norms with respect to the behavior (Cordano et al., 
2011). The more favorable the attitudes and subjective norms, the more intentions are 
driven toward environmental behavior, and intention subsequently drives the behavior. In 
their study, Cordano et al. (2011) found that while TRA did perform well in modeling a 
variety of behavioral intentions, it did so based primarily on the subjective norm variable, 
though it exhibited limitations in cross-cultural differences. 
On the other hand, Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior is an 
augmentation of the theory of reasoned action which incorporates perceived behavioral 
control, and is a more robust and widely used general theory of behavior (Armitage & 
Conner, 2001). This augmented theory suggests that attitudes about a behavior, subjective 
norms accounting for pressure from others regarding the behavior, and the perceived 
control over the ability to perform the behavior all converge on a behavioral intention, 
which then determines the behavioral outcome in a more-or-less rational assessment after 
the intention is formed (Ajzen, 1991). In multiple studies, TPB has been found to explain 
PEBs based on the formulation of intentions (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Steg 2005; 
Wall et al., 2007). In general, when (a) attitudes toward a behavior are favorable, (b) an 
individual's reference groups (such as family, friends, and coworkers) support and 
participate in the behavior, and (c) the ability to execute the behavior is relatively easy 
and doesn't require an excess of sacrifice, the likelihood of behavioral execution is very 
high. A number of studies have found the TPB to be powerful in explaining 
transportation mode choice, participating in a national recycling program, and other PEBs 
(Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Lin, 2012; Oom Do Valle, 
Rebelo, Reis, Menezes, 2005; Tikir & Lehmann, 2011; Wall et al. 2007). 
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However, existing research has often used the TPB in a vacuum, by which the 
institutionally cultivated aspects of behavior, especially the socio-contextual impacts of 
subjective norms [either descriptive or injunctive, as distinguished by Cialdini, Reno, and 
Kallgren, (1990)], are either minimized, or discarded entirely (Armitage & Conner, 
2001), and subsequently reported to be weak indicators of the outcome variable (Wall et 
al., 2007). Indeed, as Armitage and Connor (2001) note in their meta-analysis of TPB, 
“the most likely explanation for poor performance of the subjective norm component lies 
in its measurement: many authors use single item measures, as opposed to more reliable 
multi-item scales” (p. 478). In fact, Armitage and Connor (2001) found that studies with 
more items dedicated to subjective norm assessment produced higher explanatory power 
and direct effects on behavior, and they therefore called for more targeted studies of the 
subjective norm construct, which has been echoed by others (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; 
Steg, 2005; Wall et al. 2007). 
As Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) note, TPB “views the individual mainly as a 
utility-maximizing actor” involved in conscious decision making, which is a useful 
framework for PEBs since many involve intentional behavior change (p. 267). However, 
in their research of the TPB model and the incorporation of value ideology types, Tikir 
and Lehmann (2011) discovered a key finding: that when underlying values and belief 
systems were included in the TPB, they appeared to explain more variance than the 
rational-theory constructs, suggesting that the utility-maximization element may be more 
appropriately considered as a partial mediation of institutional influence. 
 Other theories have been used to model PEB as well. Like TPB, Triandis' Theory 
of Interpersonal Behavior (TIB) models social behavior based on understandings of the 
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behavior and social norms, but it differs in that it (a) emphasizes a decrease in conscious 
assessment as a behavior becomes routinized in the form of habit, (b) identifies cognition 
as the locus of rational decisions about behaviors, (c) addresses social influences as more 
prominent, and (d) offers a component of affect beyond rational calculation (as cited in 
Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). While Bamberg & Schmidt (2003) noted that the intentional 
construct of the TPB could be used to model the conscious decisions of self-reported 
assessments, it was the efficacy of the habitual and affective components of TIB which 
further explained actual PEB action (in this case, the difference between intending to 
travel by alternative means and still using a car for personal transport). Though 
understudied in its own right, TIB is a critical addition to the TPB framework by 
balancing the predictive weight of social influence and habit against isolated and 
deliberate action—its lack of representation in the literature may be attributable to the 
difficulty of measuring its constructs, especially habit (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). 
Additionally, the importance of the constructs of affect and emotions has been stressed in 
other literature bases investigating PEB, and such studies have emphasized a fine balance 
between arousing people to action and relegating them to fatalism (Norgaard, 2006; 
Scannell & Gifford, 2013). 
 The Normative Action Theory (NAT) offered by Schwartz (1977) has also been 
utilized to explain environmental activity (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Cordano et al., 
2011; Wall et al., 2007). NAT focuses specifically on altruistic behavior, and treats 
personal norms as moral necessities which control behaviors; personal norms are in turn 
influenced by awareness of consequences for behavior, and an assessment of the 
ascription of responsibility (i.e. who should act), and these culminating personal 
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obligations drive individuals’ altruistic actions (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Cordano et 
al., 2011; Wall et al., 2007). In an optimal formation of the NAT model, an enhanced 
awareness of consequences and the self-accepted responsibility to stave off these 
consequences develop a strong moral obligation to act, which fosters a normative 
environmental behavior. In their studies, both Cordano et al. (2011) and Wall et al. 
(2007) found NAT to be a good model of PEB (of behavioral intentions and car-use 
reduction, respectively), and additional research on altruism has shown it to be a key 
indicator in conservation and recycling behaviors (Milfont, Duckitt, & Cameron, 2006). 
As mentioned previously, a key limitation of these kinds of models has been their 
vacuous deployment, disregarding respondents' dispositions, values, and institutional 
context. One notable exception has arisen in the work of Dunlap and Van Liere (Dunlap 
& Van Liere, 2008; Van Liere & Dunlap, 1981), in the creation of the New 
Environmental Paradigm and New Ecological Paradigm (abbreviated interchangeably as 
NEP). These scales have been used to assess and frame environmental behaviors, and 
they represent the dominant scaling technique for quantitatively addressing 
environmental concern (Dunlap, 2008; Xiao & Dunlap, 2007). The NEP originally 
developed as a reaction to the Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP) offered by Pirages and 
Ehrlich in 1974 (as cited in Dunlap, 2008), and it consisted of three sub-domains, 
including ecological limits to growth, maintaining a balance with nature, and rejecting 
the idea that nature exists for human use (Dunlap, 2008). The New Ecological Paradigm 
was developed as a way to augment the original NEP, and it was adapted to address 
measurement issues and more holistically include environmental problems, as well as 
global warming (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000). Using NEP, Stern et al. 
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(1999) merged environmental concern with the NAT model, creating the Values-Beliefs-
Norms (VBN) theory. Stern et al. (1999) used VBN to assess individuals' support for 
environmental social movements across a variety of behavioral outcomes. As a synthetic 
theory, VBN suggests that values—i.e. political, social, personal and traditional—
converge in a worldview about the environment, and when these values are believed to be 
threatened, individuals assess consequences and the responsibility of the issue (as in 
NAT), which results in the development of personal norms (obligations) that align with 
that worldview (Cordano et al., 2011; Scherbaum et al., 2008). VBN has been used to 
account for a range of PEBs, including how personal norms mediate the impact of 
environmental world views on energy consumption practices in an organizational context 
(Cordano et al., 2011; Scherbaum et al., 2008). 
The differentiation between values, beliefs, and attitudes is somewhat ambiguous 
across multiple models. Cordano, Frieze, and Ellis (2004) followed the definition of 
Rokeach for a value as “... an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state 
of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence” (as cited in Cordano et al., 2004, p. 29). This, they 
argue, serves as the basis for ideologies, object-specific beliefs, and attitudes about 
actions or outcomes. With respect to beliefs, the term applies across PEB literature to 
assertions of fact (whether objectively true or not) about an activity or an outcome, 
whereas attitudes are more centered on positive/negative assessments toward those 
outcomes.  
A variety of other indicators also come into play, from additional theories and 
empirical studies (many of which are contextualized by the NEP scale). These include 
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many demographic variables—such as sex, education, and income—which have 
illuminated behavior patterns in specific populations: women, highly educated 
individuals, and those with higher incomes tend to engage in pro-environmental behavior 
more often than their counterparts (Coffey & Joseph, 2013; Liu & Sibley, 2012; Starr, 
2009). Furthermore, both liberal political views and general involvement in political 
engagement increase the likelihood of PEB (Dunlap et al, 2000; Coffey & Joseph, 2013; 
Starr, 2009). Many communication studies also point toward the importance of message 
framing and prompt construction, and evidence has emerged that psychological proximity 
and future orientation are strong indicators of environmental behaviors (Scannell & 
Gifford, 2013; Joireman et al., 2004; Patchen, 2010). 
 Overall, these theoretical perspectives differ in varying degrees along multiple 
research scenarios. Importantly, their syntheses have yielded more explanatory power 
than any single one alone, and many studies have tested and suggested continued use of 
hybrid theories—such as TPB/TIB/NAT and NAT/VBN models (Bamberg & Schmidt, 
2003; Cordano et al., 2011; Oom Do Valle et al., 2005; Scherbaum et al., 2008; Wall et 
al., 2007). Indeed, multiple studies have concluded that a synthetic approach to PEB 
modeling—using an admixture of salient constructs—would behoove future research and 
policy development (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Cordano et al., 2011; Wall, Devine-
Wright, & Mill, 2007). One key study by Bamberg and Moser (2007) comprised an 
empirical review of social-psychological theories and retested variable relationships 
using published covariance matrices in a Meta-Analytic Structural Equation Model. 
Using this synthesized model, Bamberg and Moser (2007) found overarching support for 
TPB when including moral and emotional constructs, which supported “the [intuitive] 
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view of pro-environmental behavior as a mixture of self-interest and pro-social motives” 
(p. 21). Taken in tandem with the findings of Cordano et al. (2004) and Tikir and 
Lehmann (2009) that the addition of underlying value indicators increases the 
explanatory power of the TPB, the literature suggests that a modified Theory of Planned 
Behavior—including the empirical investigation of institutional endorsements—could 
prove extremely fruitful in modeling PEBs. 
Theoretical Framework 
 From a paradigmatic standpoint, the pitfall in the majority of the abovementioned 
theories is the omission of an appropriately weighted institutional analysis (with the 
exception of VBN, which is often outperformed by the TPB). All models, to some 
degree, fail to connect institutional context, demographics, and cognitive processes in a 
theoretically comprehensive way. As mentioned previously, the TPB and NAT 
essentially treat the individual as a utility-maximizing agent in a vacuum, weighing 
consequences and calculations based on cognitive processes. This approach 
epistemologically ignores the institutional forces that allow (or impede) those 
calculations, and it inadvertently serves to perpetuate the narrowing of the frame of 
neoliberal environmentalism from a social-scientific standpoint of legitimacy.6 Though 
their derivatives, the TIB and VBN, respectively, add components which partially address 
some of these issues, their empirically observed explanatory power and problematically 
operationalized constructs beckon a better heuristic device for theorizing PEB, one which 
draws from both the social-psychological and sociological paradigms. 
Mouzelis: Conceptual Pragmatism 
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The work of Nicos Mouzelis is fruitful when considering how to develop a 
holistic theory for social phenomena. In a hallmark work, Sociological Theory: What 
Went Wrong, Mouzelis (1995) asserts that 'conceptual pragmatism' should be used in the 
generation and use of social theories 
...to clarify current conceptual tools and to construct new ones by following 
criteria of utility rather than truth.... [T]o solve puzzles that hinder the open-
ended, dialogic communication between social scientists; and, more positively, to 
facilitate the empirical investigation of the social world via asking theoretically 
interesting questions, providing conceptual means for comparative work, for 
moving from one level of analysis to another, etc. (Mouzelis, 1995, p. 9).  
Rather than miring analysis with traditional (and problematic) micro/macro and 
agency/structure distinctions, Mouzelis offers a set of insights and comprehensive rules 
for an open-ended paradigm (1995, 2008). Drawing on a vast body of sociological theory, 
Mouzelis asserts that 
 …individuals and structures must be viewed as analytically distinct entities…. 
Although structures do not constitute essences and although they are symbolically 
constructed, their causality is different from that of actors. Structural causality 
refers to the enablements and constraints that actors face in specific social 
contexts, whereas actors’ causality entails decision-making, agentic powers. 
(Mouzelis, 2008, p. 274). 
Mouzelis connects these causal relationships by asserting that both intra- and interactions 
at the individual level take place, considering both internal environments of action (or the 
internalized, socialized background information, similar to Bourdieu’s habitus), and 
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external environments of action, such as the “institutional, figurational, symbolic, and 
material configurations” (2008, p. 275). By merging the works of Parsons and Elias, 
Mouzelis effectively addresses the disjunctive perspectives of structural analyses, 7 
suggesting that “instead of using social structure in an undifferentiated or vague manner, 
the concept of figuration (or figurational structure) should be used when referring to 
actor-actor relationships, and the concept of institutional structure for reference to 
institution-institution (or role-role-) linkages” (1995, p. 80). 
 This position begins to rectify the truncated analytical mode of conventional PEB 
models. By weighing out information, relying on internalized information, and 
accounting for institutional systems as well as significant others’ perspectives, the 
individual acts based on internal, habitualized, affective influences, as well as on 
rationally assessed calculations of the social and the individual needs at hand. 8 This 
rectifies a key shortcoming of utilitarian theories (such as TPB), which cannot account 
for altruistic and irrational behaviors without construing them as somehow inherently 
rational. What’s more, Mouzelis’ warns against both system essentialism and actor 
essentialism, where in the former individual agency is minimized, and in the latter 
institutional influence is ignored. To account for this, Mouzelis states: 
To avoid system essentialism, one should always keep in mind that structures 
must be systematically linked to their producers. To avoid actor essentialism, one 
should take seriously into account the fact that actors’ identities and interests are 
not pre-constituted but symbolically constructed within specific institutional 
contexts. (2008, p. 275). 
 36 
 
 In a similar vein, Mouzelis treats the micro/macro distinction carefully. Because 
institutional systems can arise in both large and small groups of people, and because 
action can take place among a mass of people or by the behaviors of a single one, 
Mouzelis tempers micro- and macro-reductionism by emphasizing the importance of 
configurational wholes. These must be treated separately, and they cannot be reduced to 
the aggregate of individual behaviors, nor can they be disregarded as constitutive 
elements in the formations of institutional wholes (2008). 
 In terms of motivation, Mouzelis also points out that symbolic (institutionally 
formed) motivations and perspectives must be given the appropriate weight alongside 
rational, economic, material perspectives (and vice versa). Again, this echoes the 
limitations of TPB and NAT, and stresses the need to develop “conceptual tools specific 
to the non-economic spheres” (Mouzelis, 2008, p. 276). 
Patchen: Environmentally Significant Behavior 
 In sum, the work of Mouzelis provides the basis for a paradigmatic rationale 
which beckons the merging of sociological critique and social-psychological assessment. 
To dovetail these in the context of pro-environmental behavior, Patchen's framework of 
environmentally significant behavior (ESBF) offers one comprehensive and intuitive 
synthetic theory, which can be used to organize the above models and variables, while 
simultaneously meeting Mouzelis’ outline for assessing heuristic utility (namely that a 
framework facilitate investigation and not impose its order on the phenomena it attempts 
to frame) (Patchen, 2010). Though it draws primarily on TPB and additional appraisal 
theories, the ESBF's inclusion of values (as emphasized in VBN theory), habitual and 
affective components of TIB, and demographic and social considerations make it an ideal 
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theory of inclusion to address findings in the literature. Briefly, Patchen's theoretical 
framework suggests that environmental behaviors are contingent on the intention, or 
Willingness to Act, which is developed by a collection of rational and affective factors, 
following both TPB and TIB (2010). These, in turn, are influenced by Appraisal of the 
Situation, encompassing constructs from the NAT and VBN theories. While Patchen 
(2010) does not explicitly identify types of beliefs (such as control, normative, and role 
beliefs) in his theory like the TPB or TIB models, or specific worldviews like the NEP or 
VBN, these beliefs and values are implicitly included within his Personal Characteristics 
arena. Further, aspects of actual behavior control, institutional and space-time constraints, 
social norms, and macro-level impacts can be organized by Patchen's arena of Social 
Influences (2010), on which more conventional sociological foci can shed light. What's 
more, the ESBF gradation from immediate, cognitively calculated determinants of 
behavior to extant, indirect indicators such as social and personal indicators provides a 
robust contextualization of behavior that reflects the empirically observed, mediated 
relationships of indirect indicators (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Oom Do Valle et al., 
2007). 
 Patchen's model is helpful in coordinating a comprehensive assessment of pro-
environmental behavior from a practical standpoint, shining intuitive light on the 
complexity of PEB from individual, figurational, and institutional angles. What emerges 
from this theoretical intersection is a systemic totality of impacts on pro-environmental 
behavior: in the background, there are the extant personal and social factors from past 
experience and exposure; in the foreground, the individual's agency and emotion at work 
in the weighing of information and intention. These factors ultimately shape behavior in a 
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mixture of rational calculation, psychological relevance, moral obligation, and social 
context. Unfortunately, the breadth of Patchen's model prevents it from being tested 
through statistical methods. However, its structural layout and underlying variable 
distribution make it ideal for framing derivative models for empirical assessment. 
Theory of Neoliberal Environmental Behavior 
 Though Patchen’s model cannot be tested empirically, a pragmatic derivation of 
his framework can be useful to investigate a specific relationship between institutional 
influences and individual activity. Accordingly, in consideration of (1) the immediacy of 
climate change and the need to study behaviors which meaningfully curtail its 
exacerbation, (2) the institutional influence of neoliberalism as an ideological force on 
American citizens, (3) the robust evidence of the Theory of Planned Behavior in 
modeling PEBs and emerging evidence that the TPB mediates institutional context, (4) 
the opportunity for theoretical synthesis and its warrant in the literature, and (5) the need 
to pragmatically span the divide between sociological and social-psychological 
approaches to understanding individual pro-environmental behavior, I have created a 
conceptual model for empirical analysis which I term the Theory of Neoliberal 
Environmental Behavior (TNEB), which is shown in Figure 3. This framework is 
designed to isolate and focus on the institutional factors of neoliberal ideology, to use the 
mediation of the utilitarian constructs of the TPB model, and to assess these indicators for 
their impacts on pro-environmental behaviors. Importantly, this model is offered only as 
a heuristic device to organize the empirical analysis in the current study. It does not (and 
cannot) serve as a grand theory of explanation for all types of behavior. Rather, this 
model is derived from more encompassing theories to specifically assess the relationship 
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between neoliberalism as an institutional framework and individual behaviors which 
mitigate global climate change. Specifically, the Theory of Neoliberal Environmental 
Behavior incorporates indicators of government disapproval, the importance of free 
market exchange and private enterprise, and the dominance of economic progress over 
the environment into Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior, as well as considerations of 
demographic controls as included by Patchen’s ESBF. To be sure, the TPB is an ideal 
base model given its explanatory power in previous studies and its promising ability to 
mediate beliefs and values. However, for the current study, the TPB is especially potent 
because it represents the most utilitarian model of pro-environmental behavior: it views 
the actor’s behaviors as based on a means-ends calculus. In this way, the TNEB 
empirically investigates neoliberal environmentalism by integrating indicators of 
neoliberal ideology into an existing social psychological model of neoliberal agency. In 
essence, the TNEB adds the belief in extreme utilitarianism to an extremely utilitarian 
model, while controlling for important demographic characteristics. Having reviewed 
previous perspectives and set the theoretical stage, the current study now turns to a 
description of the statistical procedure used to test the TNEB. 
Hypotheses 
H1: That an adapted model, with institutional variables and demographic controls, 
will have more explanatory power than the TPB model alone. 
H2: That even while controlling for demographics, intentions, and rational 
assessment, neoliberal endorsements will remain empirically significant 
predictors of pro-environmental behaviors. 
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H3: That empirically significant neoliberal indicators will reflect a negative 
impact on pro-environmental behaviors. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Data Set and Participants 
To assess the impact of neoliberalism on pro-environmental behavior at the 
individual level, the current study executed a secondary data analysis on the 2010 panel 
of the General Social Survey (GSS), conducted by the National Opinion Research 
Council (NORC, 2014; Smith, Marsden, Hout, & Kim, 2013). The 2010 data set was 
ideal for a variety of reasons. First, it used random sampling, over sampling, and cross-
sectional data collection methods to obtain a nationally representative sample of 
American citizens over the age of eighteen (N = 2044), providing strong bases for the 
generalizability of statistical results. Participants took part in the survey in face-to-face 
interviews with trained survey staff, the use of computer-assisted personal interviewing 
(CAPI),9 and occasionally via telephone (NORC, 2014). Second, by using existing data, 
the current study conserved valuable energy and resources that could be used for primary 
data collection elsewhere. Third, the most beneficial component of the 2010 GSS was its 
inclusion of the Environment III module of the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP). This module was a collection of questionnaire items catered specifically to 
environmental behaviors and intentions, as well as key indicators of neoliberal thinking, 
tapping the roles of government and private enterprise in addressing environmental 
issues. The ISSP is an international coalition of social research organizations from over 
50 countries, and its modules have been used for a variety of national and international 
comparative studies (Bandilla, Bosnjak, & Altdorfer, 2003; Franzen, 2003; Hufken, 
2010; ISSP, 2010; Levin, 2014). Thus the use of this secondary data was justified on 
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theoretical, methodological, and ethical bases, since it conserved resources and provided 
strong grounds for generalizability with the use of internationally recognized data 
collection standards.  
Procedure 
For the current study, a hierarchical regression was used on the items shown in 
Table 1.10 Using SPSS Version 21.0 (IBM Corp., 2012), the regression model 
conceptually organized the indicator items into “blocks” of influence outlined by the 
Theory of Neoliberal Environmental Behavior proposed in this paper, and assessed the 
increase in explanatory power (measured by significant ΔR2) when each new block of 
indicators was introduced. As with standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, 
each block in the hierarchical regression produced an upper bound (R2) and lower bound 
(Adjusted-R2) for the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the 
model of independent variables. Coefficients were assessed in the same way as well: a 
significance test was conducted for each coefficient, and its sign and magnitude indicated 
the direction and amount of change in the dependent variable given a one-unit change in 
the value of the coefficient. The benefit of this hierarchical regression technique was its 
merger of quantitative analysis and theory, which allowed the researcher to enter 
indicators into the regression analysis in stages established by a conceptual framework. 
Hierarchical regressions have been used in past PEB research to assess determinants of 
civic environmentalism (Hartig, Kaiser, & Strumse, 2007), buying or seeking out green 
products (Hartig, Kaiser, & Strumse, 2007; Kautish & Soni, 2012; Suki, 2013), endorsing 
environmentally sustainable business management practices (Fryxell & Lo, 2003; Ng & 
Burke, 2010), and car use reduction (Thogersen & Moller, 2008). 
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In comparison with other statistical procedures, hierarchical regression has many 
benefits. First, for the current application, hierarchical regression was an improvement 
over ordinary least squares regressions, which enter all indicators into the regression 
model at once, leaving only one conceptual stage for the researcher to establish and 
precluding an analysis of the increased variance explained by adding indicators. What’s 
more, Lewis (2007) highlights a variety of ways in which hierarchical regression is more 
advantageous than stepwise regression techniques, wherein indicators are retained in the 
regression model based on their impact on the R2 value. While stepwise regressions may 
be useful for identifying a core set of indicators with the most impact, the models they 
produce are susceptible to variations in sampling error, which make empirical 
reproduction difficult 11 (Lewis, 2007; Thompson, 1995). Moreover, stepwise regressions 
effectively preclude a quantitative assessment of a theoretical framework, since the 
computer—not the researcher—determines which indicators enter the model (Lewis, 
2007). It should also be noted that while Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is often 
used to test mediation, factor relationships, and theoretical models of pro-environmental 
behaviors, the available data set did not provide enough items, in terms of specificity or 
quantity, to facilitate the use of SEM, 12 which would ultimately require extensive 
primary data collection. Accordingly, hierarchical regression was employed here as a 
middle ground between OLS/stepwise regression techniques and more advanced but 
stringent modeling methods, and because of its established use in the study of pro-
environmental behaviors specifically. 
In addition, two multivariate logistic regressions were conducted, one for each of 
two pro-environmental behaviors that were assessed as binary (dichotomous) variables 
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(measures discussed below). Logistic regression differs from linear regression in 
important ways. First, instead of modeling an increase or decrease in an outcome for a 
continuously linear variable, logistic regressions model the probability (or likelihood) of 
a case falling into one of two discrete, mutually exclusive categories (e.g. “Have 
Not/Have,” “No/Yes;” “Null/Target”) which are numerically coded as “0/1” for the 
calculation of probabilities (Wright, 1995). Second, where linear regressions minimize 
the sum of the squared residuals between observations and the line of best fit (hence the 
term “ordinary least squares”), logistic regressions maximize the probability that the 
modeled outcome will match the classification of the observed outcome—that the 
observed “yes” cases are correctly modeled into the predicted “yes” category—which is 
based on the maximum likelihood criterion (Wright, 1995). This criterion is generally 
reported using the deviance (-2LL), which decreases as independent variables in the 
model maximize the likelihood of correct classification, meaning that lower deviance 
values indicate better model fit; its value is computed by multiplying the log likelihood 
for the sample by a value of -2 (Wright, 1995). Third, for the inclusion of new blocks into 
the model, chi-square tests are used rather than F-statistics to check for the significance 
of whole blocks, and Cox and Snell R2 replaces Adjusted-R2 as the lower bound of 
variance explained, where Nagelkerke R2 serves as the upper bound. Fourth, rather than 
interpreting coefficients as slope changes in terms of magnitude and direction, 
coefficients in logistic regression are interpreted as the impact on the odds ratio of the 
outcome variable—that is, how the coefficient increases or decreases the odds of falling 
into the target (“Yes”) category. Rather than positive and negative signs, beta coefficients 
higher than 1 indicate an increase in the likelihood of the target value of the outcome 
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variable, and coefficients less than one indicate a decrease in the odds of the target 
outcome (Wright, 1995). Within PEB literature, multivariate logistic regressions have 
been used to model a variety of behaviors, including the likelihood of sorting garbage, 
engaging environmental education programs, and reusing plastic bags (Chen, Peterson, 
Hull, Lu, Hong, & Liu, 2013), the likelihood of investing in socially responsible 
investment packages (Nilsson, 2008), and the likelihood that individuals will recycle at 
home (Pearson, Dawson, & Breitkopf, 2012). 
 Indicators for each regression block were selected based on a consideration of 
both theory and previous research. To do this, the command “Display Dictionary” was 
used to generate a full list of the 2010 GSS items’ names, labels, and scale levels 
(nominal, ordinal, interval), as well as missing values. This information was copied into 
an Excel spreadsheet, and all 794 items were reviewed for their relevance as proxies for 
the constructs of the TNEB model. Through this process, indicators were flagged as 
proxies for pro-environmental behaviors, intention, subjective norm, perceived 
behavioral control, attitude, and neoliberal ideology. These items were then reassessed in 
a reflexive consideration of theory, previous research, conformity to the assumptions of 
regression analyses, and the discretion of the researcher. 
Table 1 shows a comprehensive list of the items, their variable names, and anchor 
points, while Figure 4 includes a diagram of the regression model with variables entered 
into corresponding regression blocks. For Block 1, a collection of demographic items 
were assessed for the purposes of control, including total annual household income 
(income06), the age of the respondent (age), years of education (educ), the sex of the 
respondent (sex) and the respondent’s political orientation between liberal and 
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conservative poles (polviews). For Block 2, a single intentional item, (ihlpgrn) was used 
as a proxy for all PEB intentions, stating “I do what is right for the environment, even 
when it costs more money or takes more time,” with anchor points 1 = “Agree strongly,” 
2 = “Agree,” 3 = “Neither agree nor disagree,” 4 = “Disagree,” and 5 = “Disagree 
strongly.”  
Following the work of Terry, Hogg, and White (1999), Block 3 consisted of proxy 
variables reflecting the constructs from Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior (1991). 
Three items were used to tap subjective norms (grneffme, othssame, usdoenuf), while two 
items were used for perceived behavioral control (helpharm, toodifme), and three items 
reflected general PEB attitudes (impgrn, grncon, grnexagg), with one specific item 
related to concern about global temperature rise (tempgen1). In addition, behavior-
specific attitudinal items were used in models related to specific behaviors (carsgen, 
watergen, indusgen). First, the model assessing impacts on driving behavior included an 
item measuring the respondent’s assessment of the danger of pollution caused by cars. 
Similarly, the model for water conservation included an indicator of the danger of the 
pollution of water systems.  
Finally, Block 4 contained the items measuring neoliberal ideology in accordance 
with the perspective that beliefs in general are more “distant” indicators of behavior than 
attitudes, norms, and control assessments (Ajzen, 1991; Cordano et al., 2004; Uyeki & 
Holland, 2000). These included statements such as “Private enterprise is the best way to 
solve America’s economic problems” (privent), “People worry too much about human 
progress harming the environment” (grnprog), and “It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and 
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those with low incomes” (goveqinc). These items were grouped by three categories: 
Market Superiority (grnecon, grwthelp, privent); Economic Progress Vs. The 
Environment (econgrn, grnprog, grwtharm, harmsgrn), and Government & Regulation 
(busdecid, 13 goveqinc, grnintl). Placing these items in the final block of the hierarchical 
regression was key because it facilitated the assessment of additional variance explained 
when neoliberal ideology is introduced into the model, after accounting for controls, 
intentions, and utilitarian assessments. 
A Chronbach’s alpha of .61 was obtained for all items in Block 4, suggesting that 
the indicators fit reliably well together as an assessment of neoliberal ideology. 14 
However, given that this value fell below the conventional .70 critical value, and that a 
scale was not necessitated by excess multicollinearity (as discussed below), the items 
were entered individually into the regression analysis in an effort to glean as much 
information as possible from each indicator in its own right. 15 
Though a large number of indicators was used in each analysis, this was 
supported by precedent in PEB literature (Sterns, 1999; Terry et al., 1999). Moreover, the 
use of many indicators was facilitated by the large, valid sample size provided by the 
GSS in each model. Across all models, the lowest number of included cases (N = 766) 
offered a 29.46:1 ratio of participants to indicators in the model; all other models had 
ratios of 30:1 or better, in excess of the conventional 5:1 minimum and 20:1 conventional 
recommendation for linear regressions (Harrell, 2001).16 Additionally, a low degree of 
multicollinearity in the indicators supported multivariate interpretation by ensuring that 
the added variance explained in each block was the unique variance explained by new 
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indicators, rather than a duplication of variance explained by previous indicators, with 
which the new were highly correlated (Shultz & Whitney, 2005). 
Using the procedure outlined above, a collection of hierarchical regression 
analyses were conducted on multiple pro-environmental behaviors. In accordance with 
Markle (2013) and Stern (2000), outcomes were selected based on environmental impact, 
and they represented a range of private and public activities, direct and indirect impacts, 
and degrees of personal sacrifice. First, linear hierarchical regressions were conducted to 
assess the frequency of limiting car use (driveless), reduction of home energy and water 
use (redcehme, h2oless), and personal sacrifices (grnsol, grnprice, grntaxes) for the 
express purpose of benefiting the environment.17 Next, logistic hierarchical regressions 
were used to assess the likelihood of engaging in two types of civic environmentalism: 
donating money (grnmoney) and signing a petition (grnsign) for environmental reasons in 
the past five years. 
Support for the hypotheses was assessed through an analysis of the regression 
results. Specifically, Hypothesis 1 was supported if the introduction of neoliberal items in 
Block 4 caused a significant increase in R2 for the model. This was assessed through an 
F-test for ΔR2, as shown in Tables 3 through 12. Support for Hypothesis 2 emerged if the 
neoliberal items in Block 4 produced significant coefficients, as determined by a t-test for 
each indicator (also shown in Tables 3 through 12). Finally, if the sign of such significant 
neoliberal coefficients was negative, it provided support for Hypothesis 3, i.e. that the 
neoliberal indicator decreased the behavioral outcome in question. As such, the 
hypotheses were methodologically nested, meaning that the emergence of negative, 
significant coefficients (Hypothesis 3) presupposed the significance of those coefficients 
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(Hypothesis 2), and significant coefficients generally corresponded to an increased R2 
value due to their inclusion (Hypothesis 1).  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 To assess the impacts of neoliberalism on a variety of pro-environmental 
behaviors, hierarchical regressions were used to model the Theory of Neoliberal 
Environmental Behavior proposed in this study. Preliminary analysis of the descriptive 
statistics are discussed below, before an analysis of each PEB regression result. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The descriptive and frequency statistics for all items are included in Table 2. An 
item analysis revealed some skewness among each of the indicators and outcomes 
variables in the analysis, though the greatest magnitude exhibited across all items was 
2.25, well below a critical maximum value of |3.00| (Kline, 2011). Similarly, Kurtosis 
among all indicators and behavioral outcomes exhibited a maximum magnitude of 3.10—
again, well below a critical maximum value of |8.00| (Kline, 2011). Moreover, an 
analysis of frequency histograms did not suggest skew was caused by social desirability 
bias in responses, but positive skew in behavioral outcomes (i.e., a higher number of 
responses indicating less PEB activity) may have instead reflected the lack of openness to 
PEBs exhibited by Americans, relative to other Western countries from which many 
studies in PEB originate (Markle, 2014; Patchen, 2010). In addition, an investigation of 
the correlation matrix between all indicators and outcomes revealed an acceptable degree 
of multicollinearity, with the highest magnitude of r = .71, short of the critical maximum 
value of |.80| which could otherwise impede regression techniques (Wright, 1995). 
Finally, collinearity tolerances were all above .60, in excess of the |.10| minimum cutoff; 
these high values did not indicate duplicate variance in independent items, suggesting 
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that each indicator used in the model could potentially increase the explanatory power of 
the model on the merits of its own unique variance (Berkman & Reise, 2012; Shultz & 
Whitney, 2005). 
 A few observations in the independent variables are worth noting. First, the 
average household income in the study was characterized by the category of $35000 to 
39000 per year. Second, the sample average in political views was just slightly more 
conservative than moderate or liberal (M = 2.92), and there were slightly more females 
(56.4%) than males. Interestingly, the average score for intention across the sample was 
2.38, indicating more agreement with intending to help the environment, and indeed, 
49.2% of the sample stated that they agree with the intention, even when it costs more or 
takes more time to help the environment. Environmental concern was negatively skewed 
with a mode of “very concerned,” indicating that more people had concerned attitudes 
about environmental issues than not. Further, disagreement with the assertion that there 
are more important things to do than worry about the environment was high (M = 2.37). 
Interestingly, the perceived danger of environmental degradations decreased from water 
pollution (M = 2.96) to pollution caused by industry (M = 2.89), to the pollution caused 
by cars (M = 2.53), and finally an rise in global temperatures (M = 2.45). This last trend 
in perceived danger appears to highlight a curious aspect of neoliberal environmentalism: 
a disconnection between pollution and the resultant dangers of climate change, whereby 
immediately recognizable consequences (water contamination, smog) are given more 
weight than long term consequences of global temperature rise. 
 Among the indicators of neoliberal ideology, it is telling that more individuals 
supported government regulation over businesses to protect the environment than not 
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(87.4%), and that they also supported international regulations which the U.S. should be 
made to follow (M = 1.03). They agreed that economic growth will slow down unless the 
environment is taken care of (M = 1.60), and further believed that almost everything we 
do in modern life harms the environment (M = 1.76). However, the majority disagreed 
that economic growth always harms the environment (55.5%), and they tended to assert 
private enterprise as the best solution to America’s economic problems (M = 2.25). 
Above all, they asserted that to protect the environment America needs economic growth, 
with a mode of “Agree” (50.4%) and a high average (M = 2.46). Thus, what emerges 
from these figures is a quantitative picture of the sample that reflects the American public 
in 2010: expressing more concern and support for the environment while still endorsing 
the market and growth imperatives that endanger it. 
Hierarchical Regression Results 
The results of the first hierarchical regression, on driving less for environmental 
reasons, are shown in Table 3.18 The entry of Block 1 (as shown in Table 3) revealed an 
Adjusted-R2 = .05, F(5, 760) = 8.33, p < .001, meaning the Block 1 model explained 
approximately 5% of the variance in the behavioral outcome. An increase in age 
increased driving attenuation, β = .09, as did liberal political views (β = .19). However, 
higher income appeared to have a negative impact on driving reduction (β = -.10). At 
Block 2, the explanation of variance increased dramatically to approximately 11%; at this 
point, age and income became insignificant, and political views and intention (β = .27) 
became the primary factors involved in driving frequency. When TPB indicators were 
entered in Block 3, Adjusted-R2 rose to .17, based on a significant addition of variance 
explained, ΔR2 = .07, F(10, 749) = 6.03, p < .001. Political views became insignificant, 
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but the indicator for intention remained a positive, significant indicator. In addition, 
stronger attitudes about the dangers of car pollution (β = .11), the perceived ease of 
helping the environment (β = .10), and the subjective endorsement that the United States 
is doing too little to help the environment (β = .08) all reflected a significant increase in 
driving reduction. This shows initial support for the TPB model, since one indicator from 
each construct (subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, and attitude) was a 
significant positive coefficient, and the influence of each was in the direction anticipated 
by the theory (Ajzen, 1991). This aligns with previous research on the explanatory power 
of the TPB model in explaining car use reduction (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). 
The indicators of neoliberal ideology were entered in Block 4. This resulted in a 
significant increase in the change of Adjusted-R2 to 19%, with an added 3% of variance 
explained, ΔR2 = .03, F(10, 739) = 2.52, p < .005. This provided initial support for 
Hypothesis 1, that institutionalized neoliberal endorsements add significantly more 
explanatory power to the solely utilitarian model of the Theory of Planned Behavior. In 
addition, two coefficients from this block emerged as significant predictors, supporting 
Hypothesis 2. First, the assertion that economic progress is not hindered by the 
environment had a negative impact on driving attenuation (β = -.12)—i.e., this indicator 
served as a detrimental determinant of driving reduction, directly supporting Hypothesis 
3. This triangulates the findings of Tikir & Lehmann (2011), that an inclusion of 
worldview in the TPB model increases the explanation of variance in PEBs. Additionally, 
the observation in the current study that explained an attenuation of car use speaks more 
generally to the issue of pro-environmental transportation choice in tandem with Tikir & 
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Lehmann, since their findings showed an increase in public support for the use of public 
transportation (2011). 
 However, in opposition to Hypothesis 3, the assertion that “people worry too 
much about human progress harming the environment” appeared to increase driving 
attenuation (β = .10), apparently supporting this pro-environmental behavior. However, it 
should be noted that, because this item asserts “human” progress and not “economic” 
progress, some caution should be used in the interpretation of this as a positive 
coefficient, as human progress may have been conceptually ambiguous.  
 At Block 4, it is also informative to review the items from other blocks. Intention, 
car pollution attitude, perceived ease of control, and U.S. environmental effort all 
remained significant when neoliberal items were entered, suggesting overall support for 
the Theory of Neoliberal Environmental Behavior as an institutional augmentation of the 
Theory of Planned Behavior. Interestingly, age reemerged as significant and positive (β = 
.09), while income again receded in significance. Overall, the model for car use reduction 
supported all three research hypotheses. 
Most striking was that political views were no longer significant with the 
inclusion of this block. This suggests that neoliberal ideology reflects a pervasive 
institutional framework that undermines political affiliation in environmental actions, and 
appears to play a mixed role in influencing driving behavior. This corroborates the 
assertion by Mudge (2008) that neoliberalism cannot simply be confined to the rhetoric 
of the Conservative Right, but that it must be viewed as an underlying ideology across the 
aisle of American political discourse. With respect to social psychological research, this 
also speaks to the findings of Coffey and Joseph (2012), in that the measurement of 
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neoliberal ideology appears to undermine the impact of political ideology on pro-
environmental behavior.19 
The results for modeling water use reduction and conservation are displayed in 
Table 4. As can been seen from Table 4, the introduction of controls explained virtually 
no variance in water consumption, and none of the controls produced significant 
coefficients. With the inclusion of intention in Block 2, the Adjusted-R2 increased 
dramatically to .07, suggesting that intention alone accounted for 7% of the variance in 
saving water for environmental reasons. The addition of TPB variables in Block 3 
increased this number slightly, with a significant ΔR2 = .02, F(10,777) = 2.03, p < .05, 
resulting in 8% explained. Interestingly, environmental concern became an important, 
positive factor at Block 3, with a β value of .08, but one’s attitude about the danger of 
water pollution was not a significant indicator. Again, intention was a significant, 
positive predictor across Blocks 2 through 4, and it exhibited the highest beta magnitude 
(β ≥ .21, depending on the blocks). 
The inclusion of neoliberal items at Block 4 again yielded support for Hypothesis 
1 with a significant increase in the explanatory power of the TNEB, this time to an 
Adjusted-R2 of .09. With the inclusion of this block, environmental concern became 
insignificant, while the reduction in perceived difficulty in helping the environment 
became a significant, positive coefficient (β = .09). What’s more, the addition of 
neoliberal indicators added more explanatory power to the model (as assessed by 
comparing ΔR2 values) than the attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral 
control indicators from the Theory of Planned Behavior in Block 3. Upon inspection of 
the coefficients, two neoliberal items were significant (H2), and both were negative (H3). 
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Asserting that the economy is not dependent on the environment (β = -.12), and that 
economic growth does not harm the environment (β = -.10) were both negative predictors 
of reducing water consumption. What is striking about these indicators of neoliberal 
ideology is that they were significant when controls and indicators of utilitarian 
assessment were not—views about the economy and economic growth both had greater 
magnitudes of impact (as identified by their beta values) than perceived behavioral 
control and were significant where attitudes, subjective norms, and demographics did not 
appear to play a role. Additionally, political views did not emerge as significant during 
any block in this model. This suggests clear support for all three research hypotheses, but 
it also indicates that, like the findings of Tikir & Lehmann (2011), the underlying 
institutional variables can emerge with more meaningful impacts on environmental 
activity than the utilitarian model placed in front of it, and those institutional forces can 
be influential even when the utilitarian model itself does a modest job of explaining the 
behavior in question. 
The reduction of home energy consumption for environmental reasons appeared 
not to be impacted by neoliberal indicators, with an insignificant addition of variance 
explained, ΔR2 = .01, F(10, 768) = 1.22, n.s. Table 5 shows the regression results for this 
behavior. At Block 1, an increase in age and a more liberal political perspective effected 
a reduction in home energy use. With the inclusion of intention, the impact of age was 
moderated, though political views remained significant. In both Block 3 and Block 4, 
concern for the environment and intention were the only significant indicators (with β = 
.13 and β = .26, respectively), buttressing the results of Scherbaum et al. (2008) that 
environmental intention is a significant predictor of energy reduction. Similar to the 
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results of driving practice, the impact of political views disappeared when these blocks 
were entered, suggesting that concern for the environment undermines the impact of 
political views on energy consumption, in contradiction to Coffey & Joseph (2012). The 
change in R2 with the inclusion of neoliberal items at Block 4 was not significant, but the 
entire model was, with an Adjusted-R2 value of .17, F (26, 768) = 7.33, p < .001, 
suggesting that approximately 17% of the variance in home energy reduction could be 
explained by the research model. Last, it is intriguing that attitudes toward the specific 
dangers of industrial pollution and global warming were not significant, while 
overarching general concern about environmental issues was; this may indicate that 
participants recognize a connection between energy consumption and environmental 
danger but not the specific mechanisms through which they are related (i.e. the increase 
in atmospheric CO2 caused by industrial energy production). 
Similar to the results for reducing home energy consumption, the frequency of 
avoiding products for environmental reasons was not impacted by neoliberal 
endorsements. Again, political views began as significant, but they became moderated by 
the introduction of general environmental concern and were no longer significant in 
Block 3 (as shown in Table 6). Given an extensive body of marketing literature on 
environmental purchasing behaviors (Kautesh & Soni, 2012; Starr, 2009; Suki, 2013), it 
is informative to note that global environmental concern and intention both played a 
significant, positive role where age, education, income, sex, and political views were 
insignificant in influencing purchasing decisions. The Block 4 model in which these two 
indicators alone were significant explained 22% of the variance in avoiding products for 
environmental reasons, F(26, 766) = 9.51, p < .001. 
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 With respect to recycling frequency, control variables played an important part. 
Liberal political views, higher incomes, more education, and higher age all increased the 
frequency of recycling for environmental reasons (as shown by Block 1 in Table 7). 
These variables remained important when one’s general intention to help the environment 
was included at Block 2. When TPB items were entered through Block 3, again political 
views were moderated and lost significance. At Block 3, increased concern about the 
dangers of industrial pollution (β = .12) and general concern for environmental issues (β 
= .10) both facilitated recycling while age, education, and income all remained significant 
and positive indicators. With respect to previous literature, this builds on the findings of 
Oom Do Valle et al. (2005) and Terry et al. (1999) that the TPB performs well in 
modeling recycling behavior. However, the inclusion of neoliberal indicators at Block 4 
resulted in no significant change in explaining the variance in recycling frequency and 
therefore provided no support for Hypotheses 1 through 3. 
 In contrast, the TNEB worked well in modeling one’s willingness to pay higher 
prices to protect the environment. The results—shown in Table 8—indicated that only 
political views were significant when entering control variables in Block 1, and that 
liberal political views specifically increased willingness to pay higher prices (β = .28). As 
expected, the inclusion of environmental intention at Block 2 was also significantly 
positive. Strikingly, the entry of Block 3 into the regression analysis revealed that a 
participant’s attitude about the dangers of global warming played a significant role in 
his/her willingness to pay higher prices to help the environment. Specifically, when one 
perceives a rise in the world's temperature caused by climate change as more dangerous, 
s/he was more willing to pay higher prices to protect the environment (β = .12). In 
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addition, general concern about environmental issues was also a positive, significant 
indicator of willingness to pay higher prices (β = .17), as was the attitude that 
environmental problems are not exaggerated (β = .12) and the subjective norm that the 
United States is doing too little to help the environment (β = .13). Knowing whether the 
way one lives is helpful or harmful to the environment had an interesting, negative 
impact on willingness to pay higher prices (β = -.08), suggesting that the more ambiguous 
one’s perception of the impact of one’s life on the environment is, the more open to 
paying higher prices s/he becomes. One explanation for this could be that participants 
with higher levels of perceived control may assert their lifestyles as not harmful to the 
environment and therefore not need to pay higher prices. Yet another explanation could 
be that participants recognize their lifestyles do impact the environment, but they don’t 
see paying higher prices as a viable solution. Conversely, perhaps those who find it 
difficult to determine whether their lifestyles harm or help the environment view paying 
higher prices as a clear path to mitigate such ambiguity. Whatever the case, this finding 
was curious, for it may constitute a de facto neoliberal institutional influence, in the sense 
that a lack of clear understanding about lifestyle impacts results in a default, market-
based approach to solving environmental problems—akin to voting with one’s money, 
one may also pay to help the environment. 
 The entry of neoliberal indicators in Block 4 resulted in a significant change of 
accounted variance [ΔR2 = .04, F(10, 762) = 3.99, p < .001]. This resulted in a high value 
of Adjusted-R2 for the model, explaining 30% of the variance in willingness to pay higher 
prices (H1), and all previously significant indicators from Blocks 1 through 3 remained 
significant at Block 4. An inspection of the coefficients revealed that a belief that the 
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environment should be superseded by market concerns about prices and jobs had a 
significantly negative impact on willingness to pay higher prices to help the environment 
(β = -.11). Similarly, asserting that people worry too much about human progress 
harming the environment also had a negative impact (β = -.08), as did the position that 
economic growth does not harm the environment (β = -.10). Viewing private enterprise as 
a solution to America’s economic problems was a positive indicator of paying higher 
prices for the environment (β = .08), which is an intuitive finding: those who view private 
enterprise as a solution to economic problems could reasonably be expected to view 
private enterprise as a solution to other problems, including environmental ones. Though 
this last indicator contradicted the third research hypothesis, the other indicators in the 
model aligned with the hypothesized impact of neoliberalism as stated in Hypothesis 3: in 
this case, neoliberal ideology seems to have a conflicting impact, where the emphases on 
economic growth and human progress both decrease the willingness to pay increased 
costs for environmental benefit, but the assertion of private enterprise as a solution still 
frames this behavior as permissible. In total then, paying higher prices to help the 
environment appears to be a quasi-acceptable neoliberal environmental behavior. 
 It is also important to note that with the addition of Block 4, political views 
remained significant in modeling a willingness to pay higher prices. That both political 
views and neoliberal ideology were simultaneously significant suggest that both play 
separate but key parts in influencing individuals’ willingness to use their purchasing 
power to help the environment. Because hierarchical regression does not articulate path 
analysis between blocks, it is reasonable to observe that while controlling for neoliberal 
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institutional influences, liberals are still more willing to pay more to help the environment 
than conservatives. 
 While the results for paying higher prices were mixed, the results for willingness 
to pay higher taxes were more concrete. Again, political views were significant, with 
more liberal respondents more willing to pay higher taxes for the environment (β = .29), 
as shown in Table 9. Intention was also significant in Block 2. At Block 3, political views 
remained significant, while concerns about the danger of climate change, general 
environmental concern, and the underestimation of environmental problems all played 
significant roles in increasing willingness. This adds evidence for the use of TPB in 
modeling support for higher taxes as a single behavioral outcome, where previous 
research has assessed this willingness as part of collapsed scales (Cordano et al., 2004; 
Lin, 2013). 
The inclusion of neoliberal items to paying higher taxes (in Block 4) resulted in a 
significant increase in ΔR2, F(10, 766) = 4.79, p < .001, and the model at Block 4 
explained about 29% of the variance in willingness to pay higher taxes for the 
environment—supporting H1. It is interesting to note that in this particular model, the 
addition of neoliberal items resulted in as much ΔR2 (4%) as the inclusion of intention at 
Block 2 (4%), suggesting that the neoliberal institutional framework influences 
willingness to pay higher taxes for the environment as much as an intention to help the 
environment. From the coefficients, this analysis showed full support for Hypotheses 2 
and 3: a rejection of the government’s role in mitigating income inequality (β = -.09), an 
assertion that market concerns should supersede environmental ones (β = -.11), and the 
belief that people worry too much about human progress harming the environment (β = -
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.08) were all significant, negative influences. Importantly, political views, general 
environmental concern, and the belief that environmental problems are not exaggerated 
all remained significant in the final block. This again gives credence to the idea that 
political views and neoliberal beliefs play separate but significant roles in impacting pro-
environmental behavior: in this case, to use Antonio’s (2013) terms, high levels of market 
liberalism and low levels of social liberalism resulted in two distinct, detrimental impacts. 
In comparison to the previously investigated behavior, willingness to pay higher prices 
conforms to a neoliberal framework—which explains the mixed evidence for Hypothesis 
3 in that case—but paying higher taxes to help the environment runs in direct 
contradiction to the framework of neoliberal environmentalism, and that results in a 
unidirectional attenuation of pro-environmental willingness to pay taxes. 
As has been shown in climate science research (IPCC, 2014b; IPCC, 2014c), the 
effects of climate change are anticipated to impact a variety of individuals extensively in 
the next 50 to 100 years. Accordingly, it is illuminating to assess how willing participants 
would be to accept cuts in their standard of living in order to protect the environment. 
Interestingly, this analysis showed that education level—alongside political views and 
intention—was an important demographic consideration in Blocks 1 and 2 (Table 10). 
Higher levels of education played a significant, positive role in the willingness to 
sacrifice one’s standard of living (β ≤ .08). However, with the inclusion of utilitarian 
assessments in Block 3, both political views and education became insignificant: in their 
place, a variety of noteworthy coefficients emerged. First general environmental concern 
(β = .24) was a significant, positive indicator. Second, the subjective norm of feeling 
environmental impacts on one’s everyday life (β = .09) also significantly facilitated 
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willingness to sacrifice standard of living. The significance of everyday life impacting 
willingness to sacrifice is important, echoing the work of Scannell & Gifford (2013) that 
suggests that psychological proximity—i.e. the perception of environmental problems 
‘close to home’—increases pro-environmental behavior. In addition, a high degree of 
perceived behavioral control (β = .12), and the subjective norm that the United States 
does too little to help the environment (β = .07) were both significantly associated with 
cuts in standard of living. Overall, then, when individuals felt the impact of 
environmental problems, believed they could do something about them, and perceived 
the United States to be doing too little to address them, they were more receptive to 
changing their lives as a solution to environmental peril. 
The entry of Block 4 revealed a striking challenge to this utilitarian model. The 
inclusion of neoliberal items resulted in a significant increase in ΔR2, [F(10, 767) = 3.88, 
p < .001] with a total Adjusted-R2 = .26, F(25, 767) = 12.39, p < .001. But when 
neoliberal items were entered, the impact of subjective norms—feeling environmental 
problems in everyday life and viewing others as doing too little to address them—went 
away. This suggests that a neoliberal framework moderates the impact of subjective 
norms on willingness to sacrifice one’s standard of living. That is, when considering 
neoliberal beliefs as influential on sacrificing standard of living, the perception of 
environmental problems impacting everyday life as well as a concern that the United 
States is doing too little no longer carries any weight. In other words, neoliberal beliefs 
undermine the means-ends calculus of neoliberal agency, and subvert the influence of 
subjective norms in everyday life. Crucially, of the neoliberal items which were 
significant, all of them were negative: stressing jobs and prices over the environment, 
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rejecting international regulations, and asserting that people worry too much about human 
progress all decreased the willingness to sacrifice standard of living, while 
simultaneously erasing the perceived immediacy of environmental harm in everyday life. 
Though this trend appeared only in this model, it warrants future investigation, as it 
unequivocally supports the research hypotheses and quantitatively exhibits how 
neoliberal ideology appears to contradict—and indeed undermine—experiences and 
perceptions in everyday life that recognize environmental hazards and facilitate the 
meaningful behaviors that address them. 
Logistic Regression Results 
 Two final pro-environmental behaviors were assessed using nested logistic 
regression techniques. These two behaviors were whether the respondent had signed a 
petition or donated money for an environmental cause in the past five years. Because 
these questions used simple “Yes/No” binary response anchors, logistic regressions were 
used instead of hierarchical linear regressions, and the logistic regression blocks were 
identical to those used in the hierarchical linear regressions. 
 For the likelihood of participants signing a petition for an environmental issue, the 
model chi-square was significant, χ2(5) = 73.38, p < .001. This model had a lower -2LL 
value (771.58) than the constant model alone, and it accounted for between 9% and 14% 
of the variance in the likelihood of signing a petition for an environmental issue, with 
over three quarters of the respondents accurately classified (PAC = 77.3). An analysis of 
the control variables revealed that education, sex, and political views all played 
significant roles in the odds that a participant would sign a petition to help the 
environment. Specifically, males (β = .63), those with higher education (β = 1.17), and 
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self-identified liberals (β = 1.43) all had higher odds of signing. The inclusion of 
intention at Block 2 resulted in an increase in explanatory power [Pseudo-R2 = .10, χ2(6) 
= 81.83, p < .001] and a decrease in deviance (-2LL = 763.14), both indicating more 
explanatory power than the consideration of controls by themselves (though education, 
sex, and political views all remained significant at Block 2). Interestingly, at Block 3, 
intention became insignificant, while controls remained the same. The subjective norm 
that environmental issues impact one’s everyday life become a significant coefficient (β = 
1.39), increasing the odds that an individual would sign a petition for the environment, 
and mediating their global environmental intention. This corroborated the findings of 
other investigators (Chen et al., 2013; Scannell & Gifford, 2013) that perceived exposure 
to environmental problems in one’s life has a direct influence on the likelihood of 
engaging in pro-environmental activities. 
 The inclusion of neoliberal items at Block 4 yielded an increase in explanatory 
power (explaining 15% to 24% of petition signature variance), a decrease in deviance (-
2LL = 712.85), and a significant model overall, χ2(25) = 132.12, p < .001, but it failed to 
generate significance as an exclusive set of predictors (χ2(10) = 13.83, n.s). This provided 
little support for Hypothesis 1. However, in support of Hypothesis 2, two indicators of 
neoliberal ideology were significant: the idea that economic growth does not harm the 
environment, and the view of economic growth as an environmental solution. The first 
reflected—counterintuitively—an increase in the odds of signing (β = 1.34), whereas the 
second reflected a decrease (β = .78) in support of Hypothesis 3. While the first is 
difficult to interpret without further investigation, the second shows that viewing 
economic growth as a solution to environmental problems decreases the odds of signing a 
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petition to help the environment. Put differently, viewing economic activity as a solution 
to environmental issues was diametrically opposed to engaging in democratic activity as 
a solution to environmental issues. Alone, this second indicator reflects Coleman’s 
(2013) view that neoliberalism replaces democratic process with market exchange. In 
tandem with the other significant coefficient from this block, the two contradictory 
coefficients may reflect a cultural cognitive dissonance about the impact of the economy 
on the environment. Future investigation could prove fruitful in clarifying this 
discrepancy. 
 Lastly, a logistic regression was conducted in order to model variation in the 
likelihood that a participant would donate money for an environmental cause. Again the 
control model was significant, χ2(5) = 76.98, p < .001, with a deviance of 777.89. With a 
Cox-and-Snell-R2 of .09 and a Nagelkerke-R2 of .14, the control model itself explained 
between 9% and 14% of the variance in donating behavior. Additionally, 77.5% of the 
observed responses were accurately classified with the theoretical model. An analysis of 
Wald’s tests for significant coefficients revealed that higher education (β = 1.16), higher 
household income (β = 1.06), and liberal political views (β = 1.39) all increased the odds 
that a person would donate money to help the environment, and it is intriguing to note 
that income exhibited the least magnitude of these three controls, suggesting that 
education and political alignment were marginally more important than the amount of 
money one has when modeling financial contribution. With the inclusion of intention at 
Block 2, all statistical indications of explanatory power model significance improved, and 
both intention and the previously significant controls retained significance. 
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 Similar to the results for signing a petition, the inclusion of Block 3 eliminated the 
significance of environmental intention, as well as the significance of political views. In 
both donating money and signing a petition, the lack of significance for intention reflects 
Stern’s et al. (1999) observation that forms of civic environmentalism are elusive to 
model with common theories of behavior. Again, the subjective norm of environmental 
problems having a direct effect on a participant’s life appeared to increase the odds of 
donating (β = 1.30), along with global environmental concern (β = 1.60), the perceived 
lack of difficulty to help the environment (β = 1.42), and the idea that the United States 
does too little to help the environment (β = 1.50). This suggests strong support for the 
Theory of Planned Behavior, as each construct (subjective norm, perceived behavioral 
control, and attitude) was represented as significant in the model, explaining between 
18% and 28% of the variance in the likelihood of environmental donation. 
 Neoliberal items were not significant as a discrete block, χ2(10) = 4.37, n.s., but 
the model overall was, χ2(25) = 164.71, p < .001. The inclusion of neoliberal ideas 
improved the value of deviance, reducing the -2LL from Block 3 (694.53) to 690.16, and 
it additionally increased the classification (PAC = 80.6) and variance explained (19 to 28 
percent). An analysis of the coefficients revealed no significant impacts from neoliberal 
ideas, contradicting both Hypotheses 2 and 3, and suggesting that, in this analysis, 
neoliberalism does not impact the likelihood that individuals will donate money to help 
the environment. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of neoliberal ideology on a 
variety of pro-environmental behaviors. The proposed model, the Theory of Neoliberal 
Environmental Behavior, was found in certain cases to explain more variance in the 
outcome variables than the base Theory of Planned Behavior alone; in many instances, 
neoliberal endorsements were found to have significant, negative impacts on behaviors 
benefiting the environment, even when controlling for demographics, political views, and 
utilitarian assessments. 
Table 13 summarizes the support for the research hypotheses for each pro-
environmental behavior investigated. From this table, it is clear that endorsing 
neoliberalism appears to be an inhibitor of certain pro-environmental behaviors, while for 
others it plays no significant role. However, an analysis of the table as a whole yields a 
stark result: the behaviors that align with a neoliberal form of environmentalism—
recycling, buying green, reducing home energy use, and using money as a form of civic 
engagement—do not appear to be significantly impacted or inhibited by neoliberal 
ideology. To use Stern’s (2000) gradation of PEBs, these behaviors tend toward private, 
direct activities, with relatively low levels of sacrifice, and little impact for the 
environment. However, those that tend to resemble public, institutional, indirect activities 
with high degrees of sacrifice and impact—decreasing car use, reducing water 
consumption, paying higher prices and taxes, and taking cuts in standard of living—are 
significantly impacted, and almost always negative. Rather than conforming to any one 
spectrum, the impact of neoliberal ideology appears to span across the divisions 
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developed by Stern (2000), seemingly across its own separate divide. Thus, in 
consideration of all the analyses presented here, the overarching finding is that when a 
pro-environmental behavior fits within the framework of neoliberal environmentalism, 
neoliberal ideology has no impact—positive or negative—on that behavior, but when the 
behavior is one that challenges a neoliberal institutional framework, neoliberal ideology 
does matter, and its influence is to attenuate, reduce, and decrease the frequency or 
likelihood of acting to help the environment. 
This finding has serious implications: First, it exposes neoliberalism as a 
hegemonic ideology which plays a detrimental, deterministic role against the 
institutional, high-impact behaviors most needed for climate mitigation. A neoliberal 
environmentalism has little ability to accommodate—much less advance—the necessary 
individual actions required to address the immediate challenges of global warming. 
Changes to lifestyle, increased governmental regulations, rethinking the use of 
transportation, and the democratic engagement of environmental problems cannot be 
rectified by an orientation hinging on growth imperatives, deregulation, consumer 
freedom of choice, and market fundamentalism. This study ultimately shows that a 
tendency to blindly follow market forces necessitates a blind eye to the resultant forcings 
it produces. This conclusion is not difficult to draw, for it merely asserts that 
neoliberalism as an ideology does not accommodate activities that contradict that 
ideology—the same assertion could be made about nearly any worldview. What makes 
this finding important though, is that the activities adversely impacted by neoliberalism 
are vital to the continued existence of life on this planet. As multiple scientists and 
activists across disciplines have shown (IPCC, 2013; Markle, 2013; McKibben, 2010; 
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Stern, 2000), the use of fossil fuels, the conservation of water, the regulation of 
production, and the way we socially construct a “standard of living” must change to 
preserve the very chance of living at all. From the evidence presented here, neoliberal 
thought debilitates such changes, and it must therefore be abandoned in favor of a more 
holistic orientation that can rectify a burgeoning growth imperative with the imperative 
natural limits to growth. 
Second, neoliberal ideology was not found to significantly support any of the 
behaviors that align with its tenets. In the models of recycling, green consumption, home 
energy reduction, and financial contribution, neoliberal indicators played no significant 
role. This underscores the irony of the claim that self-regulation through free enterprise 
can solve environmental problems, for the evidence here finds no benefit to even the 
private, low-impact behaviors adherent to neoliberal environmentalism. From this, it can 
be said that not only is neoliberalism a detrimental determinant to significant 
environmental activity, it is also not a favorable determinant to the private environmental 
activities of neoliberal agency. The “superiority of individualized, market-based 
competition over other modes of organization” is here shown insufficient as a basis for 
global warming mitigation and adaptation strategies (Mudge, 2008, p. 706). 
A third key finding, though not as clear cut, warrants mention. In the cases of 
driving less often, paying higher prices, and signing a petition for environmental reasons, 
neoliberal indicators produced both positive and negative coefficients. While further 
research is needed to replicate and illuminate these results, such numerical contradictions 
could potentially signal ideological contradictions within neoliberalism itself. As Harvey 
(2005) has noted, the philosophy of neoliberalism is not entirely coherent, and this effects 
 71 
 
a “tension between the theory of neoliberalism and the actual pragmatics of 
neoliberalization” (p. 21). The willingness to pay higher prices to help the environment 
appeared to reflect that kind of tension: the behavior is rooted in the free choice of 
demanding consumers, and executed through private enterprise; but the reason for the 
behavior is one that does not articulate with the basic assumptions of economic growth, 
nor a narrow scope of economic utility. Thus, when the calculus of rational assessment is 
broadened to include things like environmental harm or ethical production in its bottom 
line, it may be that other elements of the ideology—such as a fixation on growth or 
human progress—arise to maintain the hegemony of the neoliberal framework. 
Ultimately, this explanation must be approached with caution until future study can 
address it further. 
 Beyond these findings, many important patterns emerged in the data. Across a 
multiple models, neoliberal indicators appeared to moderate the influence of politics on 
PEBs, and in some models both were simultaneously significant. This suggests that the 
two play separately important roles in considering pro-environmental behavior, and that 
neoliberalism cannot be operationally conflated with Republicanism or the Conservative 
Right. This helps to contextualize the specific work of Coffey and Joseph (2013) that 
found political views were determinants of pro-environmental behavior, and it more 
broadly supports Stephany Mudge’s claim that “neo-liberalism reaches well beyond 
nationally bound politics and does not mesh neatly with right-left distinctions” (2008, p. 
721). As Mudge (2008) cautions and this research reverberates, this common misstep can 
cause social scientists to inadvertently overlook the neoliberal projects of the left, as well 
as the pervasiveness and ubiquity of the philosophy across the political landscape. 
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This study also found substantial support for Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned 
Behavior. Specifically, environmental intention was important in almost all models of 
PEB. Further, an attitude of general environmental concern consistently emerged as a 
positive influence, where specific types of concern thought theoretically relevant to the 
behavior in question did not (e.g. general environmental concern was a significant 
coefficient for conserving water, while concern about water pollution was insignificant). 
In the context of the NEP scale (Dunlap et al., 2000; Van Liere & Dunlap, 1981), this 
aligns with the view of concern for the environment as “organized into a broad and 
coherent sense” (Xiao & Dunlap, 2007, p. 471), and this view may also explain why the 
specific concern about climate change only played a significant role in the modeling of 
willingness to pay higher prices. Alternatively, these examples may instead suggest that 
individuals with a heightened sense of general concern about environmental danger 
recognize specific PEBs as beneficial, but that they may not grasp the specific 
mechanisms through which those behaviors relate to environmental benefits or harms, 
and their attitudes about those mechanisms are therefore neutral. It is also worth noting 
that all three constructs from the TPB—subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, 
and attitude—exhibited significant influence on the behaviors in the directions predicted 
by Ajzen’s (1991) theory, echoing the findings of previous research for the utility of the 
TPB model (Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Steg, 2005, Terry et 
al., 1999). 
With respect to demographic controls, political views were sometimes discretely 
influential and other times moderated by additional factors (notably neoliberal ideology 
or environmental concern). When controlling for all other variables in the model 
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(including neoliberal ideology), liberals were still more willing to pay higher prices and 
taxes for the environment, and they were more likely to sign a petition. This may align 
with Terry’s et al. (1999) findings regarding the importance of self-identity as a catalyst 
to engage in behaviors that align with the roles of that identity: by already considering 
oneself “liberal,” liberal respondents may have viewed themselves as more supportive of 
specific pro-environmental behaviors only because these were activities that liberals 
would be expected to support. What’s more, the influence of sex was not found to be 
significant in this study, except once: males were more likely to sign petitions than 
females, which contradicts previous literature asserting women are more likely to engage 
in PEBs (Coffey & Joseph, 2013; Patchen, 2010). Reflecting previous research, however, 
when education emerged as significant, higher education levels were always associated 
with higher rates and odds of PEBs (Coffey & Joseph, 2013; Liu & Sibley, 2012; Starr, 
2009). As Patchen (2010) notes, income level and age are generally not associated with 
pro-environmental behavior frequency, and overall this study reflected that trend. 
However, when age was significant, its impact was surprisingly positive, indicating that 
older individuals drove less often and recycled more often than their younger 
counterparts. 
A collection of singular results also warrants further investigation. First, 
neoliberalism explained more variance in water use than the Theory of Planned Behavior, 
and as much as intention in paying higher taxes. Like Tikir & Lehmann (2011), this 
beckons an important research question: in which cases, and under what conditions, do 
worldviews and ideologies usurp rational assessments altogether? This is important 
because it could further expose that while neoliberal agency imbues the actor with a 
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means-ends algorithm, the nature of the ideology on which it is based may usurp that 
algorithm through an underlying cultural-cognitive dissonance. The TNEB model of 
accepting cuts to standard of living is a prime example: when modeled only with the 
rational Theory of Planned Behavior, the experiences of environmental problems in 
everyday life factored into rational choices about standard of living. When neoliberal 
ideology was entered, the warnings of everyday life disappeared. This shows that the 
neoliberal ideology on which such an environmentalism is founded has a tendency to 
undermine the very means-ends appraisal system assumed by a neoliberal agency: 
indeed, the equation cannot be solved if its only answer contradicts the very symbols of 
its calculus. This may also shed additional light on why the subjective norm construct in 
the Theory of Planned Behavior has such empirically low support (Armitage & Conner, 
2001): the assessed influence of others in everyday life may be simultaneously 
overshadowed by background assumptions and overpowered by personal calculations. 
While the base TPB model addresses the latter, the consideration of institutional forces is 
often not incorporated, which is an addition of the current study.  
Theoretically, this investigation followed the insights of Mouzelis (1995) to 
pragmatically adapt the conceptual model of the Theory of Planned Behavior with a 
growing sociological critique of neoliberal ideology, drawing on Martin Patchen’s (2010) 
larger framework of environmentally significant behavior. As such, the Theory of 
Neoliberal Environmental Behavior combines both neoliberal ideology and neoliberal 
agency to model the inadequacies of neoliberal environmentalism. With respect to the 
paradigmatic goal of this endeavor, the results of this study also support bridging the gap 
between social-psychological models and sociological critiques, incorporating the latter 
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into the former to enhance empirical investigation and illuminate perspectives in both. 
However, in relation to existing literature, this study serves neither as a beginning nor an 
ending to the critique of neoliberalism and its impact on environmental outcomes—
rather, it is a triangulation. To the author's knowledge, this is the first investigation which 
has assessed this relationship through quantitative empirical means at the individual level, 
and this research appears to substantiate the assertions throughout multiple bodies of 
literature that neoliberalism may constitute detrimental determinants of environmental 
action (Antonio, 2013; Klein, 2014; Mudge, 2008). This is not the first time this critique 
has been levied, but it does appear to be the first time it has been levied in this way. It is 
certainly hoped that additional critiques will build on its methods and approach. 
The generalizability of these results is also worth noting. As a representative 
sample of the United States population, and with a high response rate for most variables, 
a good deal of confidence may be applied when generalizing these results within the 
American context. Accordingly, such representative research should be considered when 
developing behavior change programs within the United States, and many of the insights 
regarding specific pro-environmental behaviors above could prove very useful for 
program managers and activists working to effect pro-environmental behaviors in 
practice. 
That the different PEBs exhibited different collections of significant indicators 
echoes the assertion in PEB literature that the explanations of these behaviors are 
influenced in multivariate constellations of sometimes conflicting variables (Patchen 
2010; Stern 2000). As Stern (2000) asserts, no one model can account for all pro-
environmental behaviors, and while Patchen’s (2010) framework comes close, its sheer 
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size precludes it from total empirical modeling. To be sure, the TNEB is not advanced as 
exhaustive or exclusive: it does not consider all the important ideological influences on 
pro-environmental behavior, and it is not the only way to measure the relationship 
between market fundamentalism and environmental activity. The adaptations of other 
models (e.g. the VBN model) could significantly corroborate the substantive findings of 
the current study, and it is important to keep in mind that the map is not the territory, and 
the model is not the phenomenon. The main purpose of this study was to investigate 
neoliberalism and environmental activity, not advance a particular mode of that 
investigation. That said, the TNEB performed well as a heuristic device, and it increased 
the explanatory power of Ajzen’s widely used theory. 
Some important limitations within the study should be considered. First, the 
measurements of pro-environmental behaviors in this endeavor were derived from self-
report by respondents, and as such caution should be used in interpreting these results, 
since these reports may be inaccurate due to social desirability bias, poor assessments of 
one’s actual behavior, or differing interpretations in response-anchor wording (how truly 
often is “often?”). In addition, a lack of items warranted the use of hierarchical regression 
in lieu of structural equation modeling, though the latter would have allowed for a more 
detailed analysis of the predictive capacities of the variables of interest, as well as their 
potentially mediated relationships. Further, a detailed inquiry into the factor structure of 
neoliberal ideology was not undertaken here,20 and careful item development and analysis 
should be conducted to ensure indicators of neoliberalism as an institutional framework 
do indeed reflect what they are here used to measure. Finally, because this study was 
conducted through a secondary data analysis, future research should focus on primary 
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data collection to more completely operationalize and explicitly measure control, TPB, 
and neoliberal items, to benefit the empirical investigation of neoliberalism in general as 
well as the Theory of Neoliberal Environmental Behavior specifically. 
By covering multiple pro-environmental behaviors, merging frameworks, and 
quantitatively assessing the impact of neoliberal ideology, this study provides a wealth of 
avenues for future research. First, more quantitative studies investigating the relationship 
between neoliberalism and types of pro-environmental behavior would help strengthen 
both sociological and social-psychological literature—in critiques of neoliberalism, in 
more fully understanding pro-environmental behaviors, and incorporating institutional 
analysis into cognitive modeling. Undoubtedly, this study stresses a need for scale 
development, dimensionality, and factor analysis for the domain of neoliberalism, in 
order to facilitate future research. Other studies could engage the substantive findings 
noted above, especially how neoliberalism, rational calculation, everyday life, and 
political views intersect to influence environmental action. Two PEBs which were not 
considered here are the acts of demonstration and civil disobedience for environmental 
causes, which have been historically difficult to model (Stern, 2000). As neoliberalism 
minimizes forms of governance and civic participation that deviate from freedom of 
choice and private exchange, it would be interesting to see its impacts on the explanatory 
power of models for these kinds of PEBs. However, given the breadth of knowledge 
about the dangers of neoliberalism, perhaps the most important investigations have 
nothing to do with continually exposing this relationship, but asking the vital question: 
how can neoliberal thinking be changed? What can take its place as a mode of 
interaction, thought, policy, and exchange? How can individuals be engaged to escape the 
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broken calculus of neoliberal agency? On a higher level of aggregation, how can 
countries? To be sure, in order to stave off global warming, an immediate global 
paradigm shift is necessary. In the words of Weber, we do not have the luxury to wait 
“until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt;” we must act quickly before the iron cage is 
surrounded by a barren world outside its gate (Weber, 2001, p. 123). Future social 
investigations regarding pro-environmental behavior should always orient themselves 
around this key point. 
To be sure, environmental scientists have shown that humans are behaving in 
ways that cause climate change. It is up to social scientists to understand what causes 
those behaviors, to provide theories that explain them, and to assist in generating plans 
that address them. By constituting the empirical marriage of the institutional and the 
individual in the literatures of PEB and neoliberalism, this study serves to understand 
such causes through a conceptually pragmatic, sociological lens, and it stands as an 
invitation to other investigators to do the same. The second best time is now, and there 
truly is no time like the present. 
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Endnotes 
1 Though the concept of “ideology” is contentious and used in disparate ways throughout 
the literature—including by those cited throughout the work—here I use ideology as a 
patterning of ‘ruling ideas’ as proposed by Marx and Engels in the German Ideology. 
Specifically, by ideology I mean that “Men [and women] are the producers of their 
conceptions, ideas, etc….” (in Tucker, 1978, p. 154) and that “The ideas of the ruling 
class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force 
of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means 
of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of 
mental production, so that thereby generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the 
means of mental production are subject to it.” (p. 172). By this definition, neoliberalism 
is a collection of ruling ideas disseminated by various outlets serving the powerful elite in 
economic, political, and academic spheres, as discussed by Mudge (2008) and 
internalized broadly across American society subjected to those outlets. 
2 While Hayak’s works were instrumental, they were not solitary. The writings of Ludvig 
von Mises and Wilhelm Ropke, and the development of ordoliberalism in Germany after 
the First World War represented important (and fractured) perspectives in the 
development of neoliberalism as a philosophy. For an analysis of the differences, as well 
as an overview of Foucault’s perspective on the rise of neoliberalism in The Birth of 
Biopolitics, see Gane (2014). 
3 Here I adapt the cultural cognition theory as borrowed from cognitive sociology.  As 
Markle (2014) notes, “a key premise of cognitive sociology is that in addition to thinking 
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as individuals, people think as social beings, from an inter-subjective position as part of a 
group whose members have developed similar cognitive structures” (p. 247). 
4 While the terms “indicator”, “variable”, “determinant”, and “predictor” are used 
interchangeably in the literature, I specifically avoid the fourth in this study, so as to not 
exaggerate the power and generalizability of the quantitative results. Throughout this 
paper, “indicator” is preferred, and the term “variable” is used predominantly in the 
methods section for purposes of clarity. The term “determinant” is also used sparingly, so 
as to not imply the certainty of behavioral outcomes. 
5 The six models are the Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behavior, 
Theory of Interpersonal Behavior, Norm Activation Model, New Ecological Paradigm, 
and Value-Belief-Norms Theory. However, to save space, the TRA has been subsumed 
under the diagram of the TPB in Figure 1. The NEP, being an empirical model of 
environmental concern but not behavior per se, has been omitted from the diagram, as its 
measurement impacts on PEBs are assumed in the VBN model.  
6 Indeed, by simply asking questions about “why and how much” rational calculation of 
private environmental activities occur, social scientists miss the crucial ideological 
frameworks that shape—and ultimately dictate—those questions. 
7 The term “structure” has been specifically avoided in this text—except where quoted or 
discussed in reference to the work of Mouzelis—to sidestep its problematic and disparate 
conceptual associations. Instead, the terms “institution” and “institutional 
framework/system” have been used to replace what I personally view as structure, a 
replacement I believe benefits the text and avoids unnecessary confusions. 
 81 
 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Here, I draw on Bourdieu's conceptualization of habitus, though I do so primarily 
through Mouzelis' interpretation of Bourdieu's work, which I find to more clearly 
articulate Bourdieu's theoretical intention. For an extensive look at this subject, see 
Chapter 6 of Mouzelis (1995). 
9 While the use of CAPI is not as desirable as face-to-face interviews, it appears to strike 
a happy medium between personal contact and computer-assisted self-administered 
interview (CASI), the latter of which was not used for the 2010 GSS and is prone to 
response attenuation, as noted by Kim, Kang, Kim, Smith, Son, & Berktold (2010).  
10 It is important to note the difference between the often conflated terms “hierarchical 
linear regression models” and “hierarchical linear modeling.” The former is a type of 
sequential regression technique which facilitates theoretical modeling by adding 
indicators to the regression in stages, as used in the current study. The latter is a method 
of simultaneously assessing impacts on outcome indicators using data at different levels 
of aggregation (e.g. individual, group, geographic region, country, etc.) and is not 
pertinent for this research. 
11 Specifically, stepwise regression uses computer algorithms to select the sequence and 
retention of independent variables based exclusively on their increase in the value of R2, 
i.e. the variance of the dependent variable. Since (a) inferential statistical applications of 
such regressions almost universally rely on sample rather than population data, (b) 
sampling processes may vary from study to study, and (c) the variance statistic in the 
dependent variable may not represent the variance parameter in the population, the same 
indicators may produce different orders or retention patterns for regression results for the 
same population (Lewis, 2007). Therefore, stepwise regressions may be very useful when 
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attempting to investigate the ‘most important’ predictors for a specific set of population 
data, but such regression results could be misleading for inferential studies focused on 
statistic generalizability, such as the current endeavor.  
12 SEM generally requires that each latent factor have no less than three individual survey 
items statistically load (inter-correlate) upon it. In the current study, the latent factor 
structure proposed by the Theory of Planned Behavior and augmented by the Theory of 
Neoliberal Environmental Behavior would require over 21 items for each specific 
behavioral outcome, which the GSS does not contain. 
13 Two notes regarding this variable. First, this was the only neoliberal indicator entered 
as a dichotomous 0/1 predictor. Second, a discrepancy exists between the 2010 GSS data 
set and ballot/codebook, where the former identifies this variable as “busdeci” while the 
latter uses “busdecid.” 
14 Factor analysis was not considered appropriate for assessing neoliberalism among 
proxy variables in a secondary data analysis, since its results may have produced an 
erroneous factor structure for the construct. Specific item development for the construct 
of neoliberalism, as well as primary data collection, would facilitate factor analysis 
greatly. 
15 Some research, such as Cordano et al. (2004), uses composite variables for both 
independent and outcome indicators. However, because neither strong correlations nor 
multicolinearity necessitated it, the current study did not collapse multiple indicators into 
scales, to allow the variance of each indicator to contribute to the explanation of PEBs. 
16 Though Wright (1995) suggests that the ideal case-to-item ratio for multivariate 
logistic regression is 50:1, Hosmer and Lemshow assert that a ratio of 10:1 is a good 
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benchmark when the model comprises a mixture of continuous and discrete covariates 
with acceptable skewness (2000, p. 346-347). In the current study, the sample sizes for 
the two logistic regression analyses were N = 789 and N = 794, both producing ratios 
slightly better than 31:1.  
17 Each of these items includes a modifier like “for environmental reasons.” 
18 While the Constant in each regression model is included in the tables for clarity, I have 
omitted its discussion in the Results section of this paper. This is because the constant in 
regression analysis refers to the value of the dependent variable when the value of all the 
independent variables is zero, and its significance indicates whether the y-intercept would 
differ significantly from zero. Since the models employed here use Likert-type items, it 
makes little conceptual or methodological sense to assume that the lowest chosen value 
of intention, concern, behavioral control, or neoliberal belief truly equates to a “zero” 
amount of intention, belief, or concern. As such, the Constant is more of a mathematical 
artifact necessary for the regression equation to function, but not a directly interpretable 
coefficient in this application. This is a common occurrence in regression models that do 
not use exclusively ratio-level variables. 
19 Unfortunately, Coffey and Joseph (2012) do not provide an extensive account of their 
conceptualization nor operationalization for the construct of political ideology. As such, 
the current study not so much contradicts their findings as it augments the 
conceptualization process by way of specificity. Indeed, it is unclear if the measures used 
in the current study to measure neoliberal ideology overlap in any way with the measure 
of political ideology in Coffey and Joseph (2012). 
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20 The decision not to conduct a factor analysis was intentional. After serious 
consideration, it was determined that presenting evidence of dimensionality based on 
proxies from secondary data would be at best inconclusive, and at worst damaging to the 
literature on neoliberalism. Using exploratory factor analysis ex post facto on items not 
specifically and carefully designed around the theory and literature of neoliberalism 
could be considered a misuse of the procedure, and could lead others to erroneously build 
on such a dimensionality in future research. Because this item development would be 
outside the scope of the current investigation, factor analysis in this study was omitted, as 
it would only serve to overemphasize the legitimacy of the proxies selected and 
perpetuate unnecessary methodological fetishism. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1. Social-psychological models of pro-environmental behavior. 
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Figure 2. Environmentally significant behavior framework, Patchen (2010). 
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Figure 3. Theory of Neoliberal Environmental Behavior, developed as the empirical 
model for the present study. 
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Figure 4. Theory of Neoliberal Environmental Behavior, adapted for empirical 
assessment using hierarchical regression in the present study. 
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Table 1 
GSS/ISSP Items for Neoliberalism and Environmental Behavior 
Variable  
Name 
Item Wording Scale Reverse 
Coded 
LINEAR 
OUTCOME    
drivless And how often do you cut back on driving a car 
for environmental reasons? 
1. Always, 2. Often, 3. Sometimes, 4. Never Reverse 
grnprice How willing would you be to pay much higher 
prices in order to protect the environment? 
1. Very willing, 2. fairly willing, 3. neither willing nor unwilling, 
4. fairly unwilling, 5. very unwilling 
Reverse 
grnsol And how willing would you be to accept cuts in 
your standard of living in order to protect the 
environment? 
1. Very willing, 2. fairly willing, 3. neither willing nor unwilling, 
4. fairly unwilling, 5. very unwilling 
Reverse 
grntaxes And how willing would you be to pay much 
higher taxes in order to protect the environment? 
1. Very willing, 2. fairly willing, 3. neither willing nor unwilling, 
4. fairly unwilling, 5. very unwilling 
Reverse 
h20less And how often do you choose to save or re-use 
water for environmental reasons? 
1. Always, 2. Often, 3. Sometimes, 4. Never Reverse 
nobuygrn And how often do you avoid buying certain 
products for environmental reasons? 
1. Always, 2. Often, 3. Sometimes, 4. Never Reverse 
recycle How often do you make a special effort to sort 
glass or cans or plastic or newspapers and so on 
for recycling? 
1. Always, 2. Often, 3. Sometimes, 4. Never Reverse 
redcehme How often do you reduce the energy or fuel you 
use at home for environmental reasons? 
1. Always, 2. Often, 3. Sometimes, 4. Never Reverse 
LOGISTIC 
OUTCOME 
   
grnmoney In the last five years, have you given money to an 
environmental group? 
1. Yes I have, 2. No I have not. Reverse 
grnsign In the last five years, have you signed a petition 
about an environmental issue? 
1. Yes I have, 2. No I have not. Reverse 
BLOCK 1    
age What is your date of birth? Curryr - brthyr  
educ Highest year of school completed. All  
income06 In which of these groups did your total family 
income, from all sources, fall last year--2009--
before taxes, that is. Just tell me the letter. Total 
income includes interest or dividents, rent, Social 
Security, other pensions, alimony or child support, 
unemployment compensation, public aid 
(welfare), armed forces or veteran's allotment. 
25 cats. Open-last. a-y -> 0 - 
24 
polviews We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and 
conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-
point scale on which the political views that 
people might hold ar arranged from extremely 
liberal--point 1--to extremely conservative--point 
7. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
1. Extremely liberal, 2. liberal, 3. slightly liberal, 4. Moderate, 
middle of the road, 5. slightly conservative, 6. conservative, 7. 
extremely conservative 
Reverse 
sex Respondent's Sex 1. Male 2. Female  
BLOCK 2    
ihlpgrn I do what is right for the environment, even when 
it costs more money or takes more time. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
Reverse 
BLOCK 3    
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grncon Generally speaking, how concerned are you about 
environmental issues? Please tell me what you 
think, where 1 means you are not at all concerned 
and 5 means you are very concerned. 
1. Not at all concerned 2. 3. 4. 5. Very concerned  
grneffme Environmental problems have a direct effect on 
my everyday life. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
Reverse 
grnexagg Many of the claims about environmental threats 
are exaggerated. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
 
helpharm I find it hard to know whether the way I live is 
helpful or harmful to the environment. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
 
impgrn There are more important things to do in life than 
protect the environment. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
 
othssame There is no point in doing what I can for the 
environment unless others do the same. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
 
toodifme It is just too difficult for someone like me to do 
much about the environment. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
 
usdoenuf Some countries are doing more to protect the 
world environment than other countries are. In 
general, do you think that America is doing... 
1. More than enough 2. about the right amount. 3 Too little.  
carsgen In general, do you think that air pollution caused 
by cars is... 
1. Extremely dangerous for the environment, 2. very dangerous, 
3. somewhat dangerous, 4. not very dangerous, 5. not dangerous 
at all for the environment 
Reverse 
indusgen In general, do you think that air pollution caused 
by industry is... 
1. Extremely dangerous for the environment, 2. very dangerous, 
3. somewhat dangerous, 4. not very dangerous, 5. not dangerous 
at all for the environment 
Reverse 
tempgen In general, do you think that a rise in the world's 
temperature caused by climate change is... 
1. Extremely dangerous for the environment, 2. very dangerous, 
3. somewhat dangerous, 4. not very dangerous, 5. not dangerous 
at all for the environment 
Reverse 
watergen In general, do you think that pollution of 
America's rivers, lakes, and streams is... 
1. Extremely dangerous for the environment, 2. very dangerous, 
3. somewhat dangerous, 4. not very dangerous, 5. not dangerous 
at all for the environment 
Reverse 
BLOCK 4    
busdecid And which one of the following would be closest 
to your views? 
1. Government should let businesses decide for themselves how 
to protect the environment, even if it means they don't always do 
the right thing. 2. Government should pass laws to make 
businesses protect the environment, even if it interferes with 
businesses' rights to make their own decisions. 
Reverse 
econgrn Economic progress in America will slow down 
unless we look after the environment better. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
 
goveqinc It is the responsibility of the government to reduce 
the differences in income between people with 
high incomes and those with low incomes. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
 
grnecon We worry too much about the future of the 
environment and not enough about prices and jobs 
today. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
Reverse 
grnintl For environmental problems, there should be 
international agreements that America and other 
countries should be made to follow. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
 
grnprog People worry too much about human progress 
harming the environment. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
 
grwtharm Economic growth always harms the environment. 1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
 
grwthelp In order to protect the environment America needs 
economic growth. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
Reverse 
harmsgrn Almost everything we do in modern life harms the 
environment. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
Reverse 
polviews We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and 
conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-
point scale on which the political views that 
people might hold are arranged from extremely 
1. Extremely liberal, 2. liberal, 3. slightly liberal, 4. Moderate, 
middle of the road, 5. slightly conservative, 6. conservative, 7. 
extremely conservative 
Reverse 
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liberal--point 1--to extremely conservative--point 
7. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
privent Private enterprise is the best way to solve 
America’s economic problems. 
1. Agree strongly 2. agree 3. neither agree nor disagree 4. 
disagree. 5. disagree strongly 
Reverse 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Frequencies for All Variables 
Variable Name Freq. 
Valid 
% N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis SPSS Coding 
Age -  - 2041 18.00 89.00 47.97 17.68 0.29 -0.76 a_1rec_age 
Education -  - 2039 0.00 20.00 13.46 3.15 -0.43 1.24 a_1rec_educ 
Household Income     1805 1.00 25.00 16.37 6.00 -0.72 -0.13 a_1rec_income06 
Under $1000 43 2.4               1.00 
$1000 to $2999 24 1.3               2.00 
$3000 to $3999 17 .9               3.00 
$4000 to $4999 8 .4               4.00 
$5000 to $5999 19 1.1               5.00 
$6000 to $6999 19 1.1               6.00 
$7000 to $7999 27 1.5               7.00 
$8000 to $9999 37 2.0               8.00 
$10000 to $12499 82 4.5               9.00 
$12500 to $14999 65 3.6               10.00 
$15000 to $17499 72 4.0               11.00 
$17500 to $19999 34 1.9               12.00 
$20000 to $22499 66 3.7               13.00 
$22500 to $24999 78 4.3               14.00 
$25000 to $29999 81 4.5               15.00 
$30000 to $34999 99 5.5               16.00 
$35000 to $39000 89 4.9               17.00 
$40000 to $49999 147 8.1               18.00 
$50000 to $59999 143 7.9               19.00 
$60000 to $74999 174 9.6               20.00 
$75000 to $ 89999 129 7.1               21.00 
$90000 to $109999 111 6.1               22.00 
$110000 to $129999 69 3.8               23.00 
$130000 to $149999 57 3.2               24.00 
$150000 or Over 115 6.4               25.00 
Political Views     1973 0.00 6.00 2.92 1.46 0.07 -0.49 a_1rec_polviews 
Extremely Conservative 80 4.1               .00 
Conservative 315 16.0               1.00 
Slightly Conservative 265 13.4               2.00 
Moderate/Middle of the Road 746 37.8               3.00 
Slightly Liberal 232 11.8               4.00 
Liberal 259 13.1               5.00 
Extremely Liberal 76 3.9               6.00 
Sex     2044 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.50 -0.26 -1.93 a_1rec_sex 
Male 891 43.6               .00 
Female 1153 56.4               1.00 
Environmental Intention     1385 0.00 4.00 2.38 0.92 -0.51 -0.53 a_2rec_ihlpgrn 
Disagree Strongly 26 1.9               .00 
Disagree 265 19.1               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 330 23.8               2.00 
Agree 681 49.2               3.00 
 92 
 
Agree Strongly 83 6.0               4.00 
Cars Attitude     1384 0.00 4.00 2.53 0.89 0.08 -0.38 a_3rec_carsgen 
Not dangerous at all for the 
environment 13 .9 
              
.00 
Not very dangerous for the 
environment 105 7.6 
              
1.00 
Somewhat dangerous for the 
environment 627 45.3 
              
2.00 
Very dangerous for the 
environment 411 29.7 
              
3.00 
Extremely dangerous for the 
environment 228 16.5 
              
4.00 
Environmental Concern Att.     1404 0.00 4.00 2.86 1.10 -0.76 -0.08 a_3rec_grncon 
Not at all concerned 60 4.3               .00 
2 86 6.1               1.00 
3 349 24.9               2.00 
4 403 28.7               3.00 
Very Concerned 506 36.0               4.00 
Env. Effects on Life SN     1377 0.00 4.00 2.21 1.01 -0.21 -1.03 a_3rec_grneffme 
Disagree Strongly 36 2.6               .00 
Disagree 393 28.5               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 283 20.6               2.00 
Agree 577 41.9               3.00 
Agree Strongly 88 6.4               4.00 
Env. Problems Exaggerated 
Att. 
    
1343 0.00 4.00 2.12 1.12 -0.13 -1.04 
a_3rec_grnexagg 
Agree Strongly 85 6.3               .00 
Agree 393 29.3               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 257 19.1               2.00 
Disagree 488 36.3               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 120 8.9               4.00 
Lifestyle PBC     
1363 0.00 4.00 2.14 0.99 -0.13 -1.05 
a_3rec_helpharm 
Agree Strongly 34 2.5               .00 
Agree 409 30.0               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 316 23.2               2.00 
Disagree 534 39.2               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 70 5.1               4.00 
Importance SN     1388 0.00 4.00 2.37 1.01 -0.38 -0.73 a_3rec_impgrn 
Agree Strongly 38 2.7               .00 
Agree 301 21.7               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 299 21.5               2.00 
Disagree 616 44.4               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 134 9.7               4.00 
Industry Attitude     1391 0.00 4.00 2.89 0.85 -0.24 -0.62 a_3rec_indusgen 
Not dangerous at all for the 
environment 4 .3 
              
.00 
Not very dangerous for the 
environment 48 3.5 
              
1.00 
Somewhat dangerous for the 
environment 417 30.0 
              
2.00 
Very dangerous for the 
environment 545 39.2 
              
3.00 
Extremely dangerous for the 
environment 377 27.1 
              
4.00 
Others Same SN     1399 0.00 4.00 2.43 1.13 -0.53 -0.84 a_3rec_othssame 
Agree Strongly 66 4.7               .00 
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Agree 335 23.9               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 121 8.6               2.00 
Disagree 688 49.2               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 189 13.5               4.00 
Global Warming Attitude     1325 0.00 4.00 2.45 1.14 -0.31 -0.64 a_3rec_tempgen 
Not dangerous at all for the 
environment 78 5.9 
              
.00 
Not very dangerous for the 
environment 181 13.7 
              
1.00 
Somewhat dangerous for the 
environment 416 31.4 
              
2.00 
Very dangerous for the 
environment 364 27.5 
              
3.00 
Extremely dangerous for the 
environment 286 21.6 
              
4.00 
Difficulty PBC     1382 0.00 4.00 2.25 1.12 -0.39 -0.91 a_3rec_toodifme 
Agree Strongly 88 6.4               .00 
Agree 340 24.6               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 214 15.5               2.00 
Disagree 613 44.4               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 127 9.2               4.00 
United States SN     1295 0.00 2.00 1.44 0.67 -0.77 -0.52 a_3rec_usdoenuf 
more than enough. 129 10.0               .00 
about the right amount. 473 36.5               1.00 
too little. 693 53.5               2.00 
Water Attitude     1389 0.00 4.00 2.96 0.88 -0.50 -0.19 a_3rec_watergen 
Not dangerous at all for the 
environment 10 .7 
              
.00 
Not very dangerous for the 
environment 51 3.7 
              
1.00 
Somewhat dangerous for the 
environment 353 25.4 
              
2.00 
Very dangerous for the 
environment 549 39.5 
              
3.00 
Extremely dangerous for the 
environment 426 30.7 
              
4.00 
Business Regulation     1194 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.33 2.25 3.07 a_4rec_busdecid 
Government should pass laws to 
make businesses protect the 
environment, even if it interferes 
with businesses' rights to make 
their own decisions. 
1043 87.4 
              
.00 
Government should let 
businesses decide for themselves 
how to protect the environment, 
even if it means they don't 
always do the right thing.  
151 12.6 
              
1.00 
Economy Depends on Env.     1338 0.00 4.00 1.60 0.99 0.45 -0.61 a_4rec_econgrn 
Agree Strongly 122 9.1               .00 
Agree 621 46.4               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 293 21.9               2.00 
Disagree 268 20.0               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 34 2.5               4.00 
Income Regulation     1370 0.00 4.00 2.35 1.23 -0.25 -1.07 a_4rec_goveqinc 
Agree Strongly 93 6.8               .00 
Agree 322 23.5               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 244 17.8               2.00 
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Disagree 432 31.5               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 279 20.4               4.00 
Market vs. Environment     1395 0.00 4.00 2.04 1.19 0.01 -1.15 a_4rec_grnecon 
Disagree Strongly 114 8.2               .00 
Disagree 459 32.9               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 224 16.1               2.00 
Agree 447 32.0               3.00 
Agree Strongly 151 10.8               4.00 
International Regulation     1340 0.00 4.00 1.03 0.89 1.14 1.72 a_4rec_grnintl 
Agree Strongly 354 26.4               .00 
Agree 711 53.1               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 184 13.7               2.00 
Disagree 58 4.3               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 33 2.5               4.00 
Growth Harms Environment     1361 0.00 4.00 2.47 0.89 -0.76 -0.07 a_4rec_grwtharm 
Agree Strongly 26 1.9               .00 
Agree 210 15.4               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 295 21.7               2.00 
Disagree 755 55.5               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 75 5.5               4.00 
Growth As Env. Solution     1353 0.00 4.00 2.46 0.97 -0.55 -0.51 a_4rec_grwthelp 
Disagree Strongly 29 2.1               .00 
Disagree 259 19.1               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 256 18.9               2.00 
Agree 682 50.4               3.00 
Agree Strongly 127 9.4               4.00 
Private Ent. Solutions     1293 0.00 4.00 2.25 1.12 -0.13 -0.85 a_4rec_privent 
Disagree Strongly 71 5.5               .00 
Disagree 294 22.7               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 352 27.2               2.00 
Agree 391 30.2               3.00 
Agree Strongly 185 14.3               4.00 
Progress Vs. Environment     1370 0.00 4.00 1.96 1.05 0.05 -1.12 a_4rec_grnprog 
Agree Strongly 72 5.3               .00 
Agree 506 36.9               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 262 19.1               2.00 
Disagree 467 34.1               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 63 4.6               4.00 
Lifestyle Harms Environment     1381 0.00 4.00 1.76 1.03 0.26 -1.01 a_4rec_harmsgrn 
Agree Strongly 96 7.0               .00 
Agree 601 43.5               1.00 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 258 18.7               2.00 
Disagree 385 27.9               3.00 
Disagree Strongly 41 3.0               4.00 
Drive Less     1321 0.00 3.00 0.76 0.87 0.92 -0.05 a_0rec_drivless 
Never 637 48.2               .00 
Sometimes 427 32.3               1.00 
Often 193 14.6               2.00 
Always 64 4.8               3.00 
Use Less Water     1419 0.00 3.00 0.90 0.96 0.64 -0.76 a_0rec_h2oless 
Never 631 44.5               .00 
Sometimes 386 27.2               1.00 
Often 308 21.7               2.00 
Always 94 6.6               3.00 
Buy Green Products     1407 0.00 3.00 1.11 0.91 0.38 -0.73 a_0rec_nobuygrn 
Never 411 29.2               .00 
Sometimes 540 38.4               1.00 
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Often 351 24.9               2.00 
Always 105 7.5               3.00 
Recycle     1394 0.00 3.00 1.90 1.08 -0.46 -1.15 a_0rec_recycle 
Never 190 13.6               .00 
Sometimes 317 22.7               1.00 
Often 324 23.2               2.00 
Always 563 40.4               3.00 
Reduce Home Energy     1417 0.00 3.00 1.29 0.97 0.15 -1.02 a_0rec_redcehme 
Never 362 25.5               .00 
Sometimes 450 31.8               1.00 
Often 440 31.1               2.00 
Always 165 11.6               3.00 
Pay Higher Prices for Env.     1361 0.00 4.00 2.08 1.22 -0.39 -0.96 a_0rec_grnprice 
Very unwilling 209 15.4               .00 
Fairly unwilling 222 16.3               1.00 
Neither willing nor unwilling 293 21.5               2.00 
Fairly willing 527 38.7               3.00 
Very willing 110 8.1               4.00 
Pay Higher Taxes for Env.     1368 0.00 4.00 1.69 1.28 0.05 -1.26 a_0rec_grntaxes 
Very unwilling 343 25.1               .00 
Fairly unwilling 283 20.7               1.00 
Neither willing nor unwilling 283 20.7               2.00 
Fairly willing 377 27.6               3.00 
Very willing 82 6.0               4.00 
Take Cut in Standard of 
Living 
    
1374 0.00 4.00 1.74 1.26 -0.03 -1.26 
a_0rec_grnsol 
Very unwilling 324 23.6               .00 
Fairly unwilling 276 20.1               1.00 
Neither willing nor unwilling 288 21.0               2.00 
Fairly willing 409 29.8               3.00 
Very willing 77 5.6               4.00 
Green Donation     1415 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39 1.65 0.71 a_dic_grnmoney 
No, I have not. 1157 81.8               .00 
Yes I have. 258 18.2               1.00 
Green Petition     1403 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.38 1.76 1.11 a_dic_grnsign 
No, I have not. 1165 83.0               .00 
Yes I have. 238 17.0               1.00 
 
Table 3 
Hierarchical Regression Results: Driving Less Often For Environmental Reasons (N = 
765) 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Variable B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β 
Constant 0.38 0.2     -0.1 0.2     -0.68 0.22 **   -0.66 0.33 *   
Age 0.01 0 * 0.09 0 0   0.05 0 0   0.07 0.01 0 * 0.09 
Education 0.01 0.01   0.02 0 0.01   0.01 -0.01 0.01   -0.02 -0.01 0.01   -0.02 
Household 
Income 
-0.02 0.01 * -0.1 -0.01 0.01   -0.08 -0.01 0.01 * -0.09 -0.01 0.01   -0.06 
Sex 0.05 0.06   0.03 0.04 0.06   0.03 -0.01 0.06   -0.01 -0.02 0.06   -0.01 
Political 
Views 
0.12 0.02 *** 0.19 0.11 0.02 *** 0.18 0.04 0.02   0.07 0.04 0.02   0.07 
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Environmental 
Intention 
        0.26 0.03 *** 0.27 0.21 0.04 *** 0.21 0.2 0.04 *** 0.2 
Cars Attitude                 0.11 0.04 *** 0.11 0.1 0.04 * 0.09 
GW Attitude                 0.05 0.03   0.06 0.04 0.03   0.06 
Env. Concern 
Att. 
                0.03 0.04   0.03 0.02 0.04   0.02 
Env. Effects 
on Life SN 
                0.05 0.03   0.06 0.03 0.03   0.04 
Env. Problems 
Exaggerated 
Att. 
                0.02 0.03   0.03 0.04 0.04   0.05 
Lifestyle PBC                 0.05 0.03   0.06 0.06 0.03   0.07 
Importance 
Att. 
                -0.01 0.03   -0.02 -0.01 0.03   -0.02 
Others Same 
SN 
                -0.02 0.03   -0.02 -0.01 0.03   -0.01 
Difficulty 
PBC 
                0.08 0.03 * 0.1 0.1 0.04 ** 0.12 
United States 
SN 
                0.11 0.05 * 0.08 0.11 0.05 * 0.08 
Business 
Regulation 
                        0.08 0.1   0.03 
Economy 
Dep. on Env. 
                        -0.1 0.03 ** -0.12 
Income 
Regulation 
                        -0.03 0.03   -0.04 
Market Vs. 
Env. 
                        -0.02 0.03   -0.03 
International 
Regulation 
                        0.05 0.04   0.05 
Progress Vs. 
Env. 
                        0.09 0.03 ** 0.1 
Growth 
Harms Env. 
                        -0.02 0.04   -0.02 
Growth As 
Env. Solution 
                        -0.03 0.03   -0.04 
Lifestyle 
Harms Env. 
                        -0.04 0.03   -0.05 
Private Ent. 
Solutions 
                        0.05 0.03   0.07 
Adjusted R2 0.05       0.11       0.17       0.19       
F (df1, df2) 8.33 (5, 760) *** 17.43 (6, 759) *** 10.74 (16, 749) *** 7.71 (26, 739) *** 
ΔR2 -       0.07       0.07       0.03       
ΔR2 F 
(df1,df2) 
- - -   59.73 (5, 759) *** 6.03 (10, 749) *** 2.52 (10, 739) ** 
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <.001 
 
Table 4  
Hierarchical Regression Results: Reducing Water Use For Environmental Reasons (N = 
793) 
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  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Variable B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β 
Constant 1.07 0.21 ***   0.57 0.21 **   0.29 0.24     0.26 0.38     
Age 0.00 0.00   0.01 0.00 0.00   -0.03 0.00 0.00   -0.03 0.00 0.00   -0.02 
Education 0.00 0.01   -0.01 -0.01 0.01   -0.03 -0.01 0.01   -0.04 -0.01 0.01   -0.02 
Household 
Income 
-0.01 0.01 
  
-0.06 -0.01 0.01 
  
-0.05 -0.01 0.01 
  
-0.06 -0.01 0.01 
  
-0.03 
Sex 0.06 0.07   0.03 0.06 0.07   0.03 0.03 0.07   0.01 0.02 0.07   0.01 
Political 
Views 
0.02 0.02 
  
0.03 0.02 0.02 
  
0.03 -0.02 0.03 
  
-0.03 -0.02 0.03 
  
-0.03 
Environmental 
Intention         
0.27 0.04 
*** 
0.26 0.23 0.04 
*** 
0.22 0.22 0.04 
*** 
0.21 
Water 
Attitude                 
0.05 0.04 
  
0.05 0.05 0.05 
  
0.04 
GW Attitude                 -0.02 0.04   -0.03 -0.04 0.04   -0.05 
Env. Concern 
Att.                 
0.08 0.04 
* 
0.08 0.07 0.04 
  
0.07 
Env. Effects 
on Life SN                 
0.04 0.04 
  
0.04 0.02 0.04 
  
0.02 
Env. Problems 
Exaggerated 
Att.                 
0.04 0.04 
  
0.05 0.07 0.04 
  
0.08 
Lifestyle PBC                 0.03 0.04   0.03 0.04 0.04   0.04 
Importance 
Att.                 
-0.02 0.04 
  
-0.02 -0.02 0.04 
  
-0.02 
Others Same 
SN                 
-0.06 0.04 
  
-0.07 -0.04 0.04 
  
-0.05 
Difficulty 
PBC                 
0.05 0.04 
  
0.06 0.08 0.04 
* 
0.09 
United States 
SN                 
0.05 0.06 
  
0.04 0.06 0.06 
  
0.04 
Business 
Regulation                         
0.14 0.11 
  
0.05 
Economy 
Dep. on Env.                         
-0.11 0.04 
** 
-0.12 
Income 
Regulation                         
0.02 0.03 
  
0.02 
Market Vs. 
Env.                         
0.01 0.04 
  
0.01 
International 
Regulation                         
-0.01 0.04 
  
-0.01 
Progress Vs. 
Env.                         
0.06 0.04 
  
0.06 
Growth 
Harms Env.                         
-0.11 0.04 
* 
-0.10 
Growth As 
Env. Solution                         
0.02 0.04 
  
0.02 
Lifestyle 
Harms Env.                         
-0.02 0.04 
  
-0.02 
Private Ent. 
Solutions                         
0.04 0.03 
  
0.05 
Adjusted R2 0.00       
0.07       0.08       0.09   
  
  
F (df1, df2) 1.11 (5, 788)   10.22 (6, 787) *** 5.15 (16, 777) *** 4.17 (26, 767) *** 
ΔR2 -       0.07       0.02       0.03       
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ΔR2 F 
(df1,df2) - - -   55.36 (1, 787) *** 2.03 (10, 777) * 
2.45 
(10, 767) ** 
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <.001 
 
Table 5 
Hierarchical Regression Results: Reducing Home Energy Use For Environment (N = 
794) 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Variable B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β 
Constant 0.76 0.20 ***   0.12 0.20     -0.45 0.23 *   -0.85 0.36 *   
Age 0.01 0.00 ** 0.10 0.00 0.00   0.05 0.00 0.00   0.06 0.00 0.00   0.06 
Education 0.01 0.01   0.02 0.00 0.01   0.00 0.00 0.01   -0.01 0.00 0.01   0.00 
Household 
Income 
0.00 0.01 
  
-0.03 0.00 0.01 
  
-0.01 0.00 0.01 
  
-0.01 0.00 0.01 
  
0.01 
Sex 0.12 0.07   0.06 0.12 0.06   0.06 0.08 0.06   0.04 0.07 0.07   0.04 
Political 
Views 
0.09 0.02 
*** 
0.14 0.08 0.02 
*** 
0.13 0.02 0.02 
  
0.04 0.03 0.02 
  
0.05 
Environmental 
Intention         
0.34 0.03 
*** 
0.32 0.27 0.04 
*** 
0.26 0.27 0.04 
*** 
0.26 
Industry 
Attitude                 
0.06 0.04 
  
0.05 0.05 0.05 
  
0.05 
GW Attitude                 0.04 0.03   0.04 0.04 0.04   0.05 
Env. Concern 
Att.                 
0.12 0.04 
** 
0.13 0.12 0.04 
*** 
0.13 
Env. Effects 
on Life SN                 
0.04 0.03 
  
0.04 0.04 0.03 
  
0.04 
Env. Problems 
Exaggerated 
Att.                 
0.04 0.04 
  
0.04 0.06 0.04 
  
0.08 
Lifestyle PBC                 0.03 0.03   0.03 0.03 0.03   0.04 
Importance 
Att.                 
0.01 0.04 
  
0.01 0.01 0.04 
  
0.02 
Others Same 
SN                 
0.02 0.03 
  
0.02 0.02 0.03 
  
0.03 
Difficulty 
PBC                 
-0.01 0.04 
  
-0.01 0.01 0.04 
  
0.01 
United States 
SN                 
0.03 0.05 
  
0.02 0.05 0.06 
  
0.03 
Business 
Regulation                         
-0.01 0.10 
  
0.00 
Economy 
Dep. on Env.                         
-0.06 0.03 
  
-0.06 
Income 
Regulation                         
0.03 0.03 
  
0.04 
Market Vs. 
Env.                         
0.03 0.03 
  
0.04 
International 
Regulation                         
0.04 0.04 
  
0.03 
 99 
 
Progress Vs. 
Env.                         
0.06 0.03 
  
0.06 
Growth 
Harms Env.                         
-0.05 0.04 
  
-0.05 
Growth As 
Env. Solution                         
0.01 0.03 
  
0.01 
Lifestyle 
Harms Env.                         
0.00 0.03 
  
0.01 
Private Ent. 
Solutions                         
0.02 0.03 
  
0.02 
Adjusted R2 0.03       0.13       0.17       0.17     
  
F (df1, df2) 5.53 (5, 789) *** 20.81 (6, 788) *** 11.12 (16, 778) *** 7.33 (26, 768) *** 
ΔR2         0.10       0.05       0.01       
ΔR2 F 
(df1,df2)         93.95 (1, 7888) *** 4.72 (10, 778) *** 
1.22 
(10, 768)   
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <.001 
 
Table 6 
Hierarchical Regression Results: Avoid Environmentally Hazardous Products (N = 792) 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Variable B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β 
Constant 0.38 0.19     -0.22 0.19     -0.82 0.21   *** -0.89 0.33     
Age 0.00 0.00   0.04 0.00 0.00   -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.01 
Education 0.03 0.01   0.11 0.03 0.01   0.09 0.02 0.01 0.06   0.02 0.01   0.07 
Household 
Income 
0.00 0.01 
  
-0.02 0.00 0.01 
  
-0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
  
0.00 0.01 
  
0.00 
Sex 0.12 0.06   0.07 0.12 0.06   0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04   0.05 0.06   0.03 
Political 
Views 
0.09 0.02 
*** 
0.16 0.09 0.02 
*** 
0.14 0.03 0.02 0.04 
  
0.03 0.02 
  
0.04 
Environmental 
Intention         
0.33 0.03 
*** 
0.33 0.24 0.03 0.24 
*** 
0.24 0.03 
*** 
0.25 
Industry 
Attitude                 
0.05 0.04 0.05 
  
0.05 0.04 
  
0.05 
GW Attitude                 -0.01 0.03 -0.01   -0.01 0.03   -0.01 
Env. Concern 
Att.                 
0.12 0.03 0.14 
*** 
0.12 0.03 
*** 
0.14 
Env. Effects 
on Life SN                 
0.09 0.03 0.11 
  
0.08 0.03 
  
0.10 
Env. Problems 
Exaggerated 
Att.                 
0.03 0.03 0.03 
  
0.03 0.03 
  
0.04 
Lifestyle PBC                 0.05 0.03 0.06   0.05 0.03   0.06 
Importance 
Att.                 
0.00 0.03 0.00 
  
0.01 0.03 
  
0.01 
Others Same 
SN                 
-0.02 0.03 -0.02 
  
-0.01 0.03 
  
-0.02 
Difficulty 
PBC                 
0.06 0.03 0.07 
  
0.07 0.03 
  
0.08 
 100 
 
United States 
SN                 
0.11 0.05 0.08 
  
0.12 0.05 
  
0.09 
Business 
Regulation                         
0.03 0.09 
  
0.01 
Economy 
Dep. on Env.                         
-0.05 0.03 
  
-0.06 
Income 
Regulation                         
-0.01 0.03 
  
-0.02 
Market Vs. 
Env.                         
-0.01 0.03 
  
-0.02 
International 
Regulation                         
0.06 0.04 
  
0.06 
Progress Vs. 
Env.                         
0.02 0.03 
  
0.03 
Growth 
Harms Env.                         
-0.03 0.04 
  
-0.02 
Growth As 
Env. Solution                         
0.03 0.03 
  
0.03 
Lifestyle 
Harms Env.                         
-0.03 0.03 
  
-0.04 
Private Ent. 
Solutions                         
0.01 0.03 
  
0.02 
Adjusted R2 0.04       0.15       0.22       0.22     
  
F (df1, df2) 7.56 (5, 787) *** 23.92 (6, 786) *** 14.81 (16, 776) *** 9.51 (26, 766) *** 
ΔR2         0.11       0.08       0.01       
ΔR2 F 
(df1,df2)         100.90 (1, 786) *** 8.05 (10, 776) *** 
1.03 
(10, 766)   
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <.001 
 
Table 7 
Hierarchical Regression Results: Recycling (N = 792) 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Variable B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β 
Constant 0.21 0.22     -0.38 0.22     -1.02 0.25 ***   -1.31 0.39 ***   
Age 0.01 0.00 *** 0.15 0.01 0.00 ** 0.11 0.01 0.00 *** 0.12 0.01 0.00 *** 0.12 
Education 0.06 0.01 *** 0.16 0.05 0.01 *** 0.14 0.04 0.01 *** 0.12 0.04 0.01 ** 0.12 
Household 
Income 
0.02 0.01 
* 
0.09 0.02 0.01 
** 
0.11 0.02 0.01 
** 
0.10 0.02 0.01 
** 
0.11 
Sex 0.04 0.07   0.02 0.03 0.07   0.01 -0.05 0.07   -0.02 -0.04 0.07   -0.02 
Political 
Views 
0.09 0.02 
*** 
0.13 0.09 0.02 
*** 
0.12 0.03 0.03 
  
0.04 0.03 0.03 
  
0.05 
Environmental 
Intention         
0.31 0.04 
*** 
0.27 0.25 0.04 
*** 
0.21 0.24 0.04 
*** 
0.21 
Industry 
Attitude                 
0.15 0.05 
** 
0.12 0.14 0.05 
** 
0.11 
GW Attitude                 -0.04 0.04   -0.04 -0.03 0.04   -0.04 
Env. Concern 
Att.                 
0.10 0.04 
* 
0.10 0.10 0.04 
* 
0.10 
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Env. Effects 
on Life SN                 
0.01 0.04 
  
0.01 0.00 0.04 
  
0.00 
Env. Problems 
Exaggerated 
Att.                 
0.06 0.04 
  
0.07 0.08 0.04 
* 
0.09 
Lifestyle PBC                 0.03 0.04   0.03 0.03 0.04   0.03 
Importance 
Att.                 
0.02 0.04 
  
0.02 0.03 0.04 
  
0.03 
Others Same 
SN                 
0.01 0.04 
  
0.01 0.01 0.04 
  
0.01 
Difficulty 
PBC                 
0.05 0.04 
  
0.05 0.06 0.04 
  
0.06 
United States 
SN                 
0.05 0.06 
  
0.03 0.06 0.06 
  
0.04 
Business 
Regulation                         
-0.02 0.11 
  
-0.01 
Economy 
Dep. on Env.                         
-0.03 0.04 
  
-0.03 
Income 
Regulation                         
0.01 0.03 
  
0.01 
Market Vs. 
Env.                         
0.00 0.04 
  
0.00 
International 
Regulation                         
0.02 0.04 
  
0.01 
Progress Vs. 
Env.                         
0.07 0.04 
  
0.07 
Growth 
Harms Env.                         
0.00 0.05 
  
0.00 
Growth As 
Env. Solution                         
0.01 0.04 
  
0.01 
Lifestyle 
Harms Env.                         
-0.03 0.04 
  
-0.03 
Private Ent. 
Solutions                         
0.04 0.03 
  
0.04 
Adjusted R2 0.08       0.15       0.19       0.19     
  
F (df1, df2) 14.44 (5, 782) *** 24.37 (6, 781) *** 12.77 (16, 771) *** 8.07 (26, 761) *** 
ΔR2         0.07       0.05       0.01       
ΔR2 F 
(df1,df2)         67.84 (1, 781) *** 5.05 (10, 771) *** 
0.65 
(10, 761)   
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <.001 
 
Table 8 
Hierarchical Regression Results: Willingness to Pay Higher Prices for Environment (N = 
787) 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Variable B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β 
Constant 1.03 0.25 ***   0.44 0.26     -0.45 0.26     0.98 0.40 *   
Age 0.00 0.00   0.06 0.00 0.00   0.02 0.00 0.00   0.04 0.00 0.00   0.05 
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Education 0.02 0.02   0.05 0.01 0.01   0.04 0.01 0.01   0.02 0.01 0.01   0.02 
Household 
Income 
0.00 0.01 
  
0.00 0.00 0.01 
  
0.01 0.01 0.01 
  
0.03 0.00 0.01 
  
0.01 
Sex 0.05 0.08   0.02 0.05 0.08   0.02 -0.05 0.07   -0.02 0.00 0.08   0.00 
Political 
Views 
0.23 0.03 
*** 
0.28 0.22 0.03 
*** 
0.27 0.08 0.03 
** 
0.09 0.07 0.03 
* 
0.08 
Environmental 
Intention         
0.32 0.04 
*** 
0.24 0.21 0.04 
*** 
0.16 0.21 0.04 
*** 
0.16 
GW Attitude                 0.13 0.04 ** 0.12 0.08 0.04 * 0.08 
Env. Concern 
Att.                 
0.20 0.04 
*** 
0.18 0.17 0.04 
*** 
0.15 
Env. Effects 
on Life SN                 
0.06 0.04 
  
0.06 0.02 0.04 
  
0.01 
Env. Problems 
Exaggerated 
Att.                 
0.12 0.04 
** 
0.12 0.09 0.04 
* 
0.08 
Lifestyle PBC                 -0.10 0.04 * -0.08 -0.11 0.04 ** -0.09 
Importance 
Att.                 
0.06 0.04 
  
0.05 0.02 0.04 
  
0.02 
Others Same 
SN                 
-0.04 0.04 
  
-0.04 -0.02 0.04 
  
-0.02 
Difficulty 
PBC                 
0.06 0.04 
  
0.05 0.05 0.04 
  
0.04 
United States 
SN                 
0.18 0.06 
** 
0.10 0.13 0.06 
* 
0.07 
Business 
Regulation                         
-0.15 0.12 
  
-0.04 
Economy 
Dep. on Env.                         
-0.02 0.04 
  
-0.01 
Income 
Regulation                         
-0.03 0.03 
  
-0.03 
Market Vs. 
Env.                         
-0.11 0.04 
** 
-0.11 
International 
Regulation                         
-0.09 0.05 
  
-0.06 
Progress Vs. 
Env.                         
-0.09 0.04 
* 
-0.08 
Growth 
Harms Env.                         
-0.13 0.05 
** 
-0.10 
Growth As 
Env. Solution                         
0.00 0.04 
  
0.00 
Lifestyle 
Harms Env.                         
-0.02 0.04 
  
-0.02 
Private Ent. 
Solutions                         
0.09 0.04 
* 
0.08 
Adjusted R2 0.08       0.14       0.28       0.30       
F (df1, df2) 14.59 (5, 782) *** 21.61 (6, 781) *** 20.90 (15, 772) *** 14.62 (25, 762) *** 
ΔR2         0.06       0.15       0.04       
ΔR2 F 
(df1,df2)         51.95 (1, 781) *** 17.66 (9, 772) *** 
3.99 
(10, 762) *** 
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <.001 
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Table 9 
Hierarchical Regression Results: Willingness to Pay Higher Taxes for Environment (N = 
791) 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Variable B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β 
Constant 0.63 0.26 *   0.13 0.27     -0.76 0.28 **   1.38 0.43 **   
Age 0.00 0.00   0.02 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00   0.02 0.00 0.00   0.04 
Education 0.03 0.02   0.07 0.03 0.02   0.06 0.01 0.02   0.03 0.02 0.02   0.04 
Household 
Income 
0.00 0.01 
  
-0.02 0.00 0.01 
  
-0.01 0.00 0.01 
  
-0.01 0.00 0.01 
  
-0.02 
Sex 0.08 0.09   0.03 0.08 0.08   0.03 -0.03 0.08   -0.01 -0.06 0.08   -0.02 
Political 
Views 
0.25 0.03 
*** 
0.29 0.24 0.03 
*** 
0.29 0.11 0.03 
*** 
0.12 0.07 0.03 
* 
0.08 
Environmental 
Intention 
        
0.27 0.05 
*** 
0.20 0.15 0.05 
** 
0.11 0.15 0.05 
*** 
0.11 
GW Attitude                 0.10 0.04 * 0.09 0.02 0.04   0.02 
Env. Concern 
Att. 
                
0.21 0.05 
*** 
0.18 0.17 0.04 
*** 
0.14 
Env. Effects 
on Life SN 
                
0.06 0.04 
  
0.05 0.01 0.04 
  
0.01 
Env. Problems 
Exaggerated 
Att. 
                
0.16 0.04 
*** 
0.14 0.10 0.04 
* 
0.10 
Lifestyle PBC                 -0.06 0.04   -0.05 -0.07 0.04   -0.05 
Importance 
Att. 
                
0.03 0.04 
  
0.03 -0.01 0.04 
  
-0.01 
Others Same 
SN 
                
0.02 0.04 
  
0.02 0.05 0.04 
  
0.04 
Difficulty 
PBC 
                
0.06 0.04 
  
0.05 0.06 0.04 
  
0.05 
United States 
SN 
                
0.13 0.07 
  
0.07 0.04 0.07 
  
0.02 
Business 
Regulation 
                        
-0.09 0.12 
  
-0.02 
Economy 
Dep. on Env. 
                        
-0.04 0.04 
  
-0.04 
Income 
Regulation 
                        
-0.09 0.04 
* 
-0.09 
Market Vs. 
Env. 
                        
-0.12 0.04 
** 
-0.11 
International 
Regulation 
                        
-0.08 0.05 
  
-0.06 
Progress Vs. 
Env. 
                        
-0.09 0.04 
* 
-0.08 
Growth 
Harms Env. 
                        
-0.08 0.05 
  
-0.06 
Growth As 
Env. Solution 
                        
-0.07 0.04 
  
-0.06 
Lifestyle 
Harms Env. 
                        
-0.08 0.04 
  
-0.07 
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Private Ent. 
Solutions 
                        
-0.02 0.04 
  
-0.02 
Adjusted R2 0.09       0.13       0.25       0.29     
  
F (df1, df2) 16.87 (5, 786) *** 20.34 (6, 785) *** 18.58 (15, 776) *** 13.61 (25, 766) *** 
ΔR2         0.04       0.13       0.04       
ΔR2 F 
(df1,df2)         34.13 (1, 785) *** 15.20 (9, 776) *** 
4.79 
(10, 766) *** 
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <.001 
 
Table 10 
Hierarchical Regression Results: Willingness to Sacrifice Standard of Living for 
Environment (N = 792) 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Variable B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β 
Constant 0.68 0.26 *   0.10 0.27     -0.80 0.28 **   0.80 0.43     
Age 0.00 0.00   -0.03 0.00 0.00   -0.06 0.00 0.00   -0.04 0.00 0.00   -0.04 
Education 0.04 0.02 * 0.09 0.04 0.02 * 0.08 0.02 0.02   0.05 0.02 0.02   0.04 
Household 
Income 
0.01 0.01 
  
0.04 0.01 0.01 
  
0.05 0.01 0.01 
  
0.04 0.00 0.01 
  
0.01 
Sex 0.10 0.09   0.04 0.09 0.08   0.04 0.01 0.08   0.00 0.05 0.08   0.02 
Political 
Views 
0.18 0.03 
*** 
0.22 0.18 0.03 
*** 
0.21 0.05 0.03 
  
0.06 0.04 0.03 
  
0.05 
Environmental 
Intention 
        
0.31 0.05 
*** 
0.22 0.16 0.05 
*** 
0.12 0.17 0.05 
*** 
0.12 
GW Attitude                 0.08 0.04   0.07 0.04 0.04   0.04 
Env. Concern 
Att. 
                
0.29 0.05 
*** 
0.24 0.26 0.04 
*** 
0.22 
Env. Effects 
on Life SN 
                
0.11 0.04 
** 
0.09 0.07 0.04 
  
0.06 
Env. Problems 
Exaggerated 
Att. 
                
0.05 0.04 
  
0.05 0.01 0.05 
  
0.01 
Lifestyle PBC                 -0.02 0.04   -0.01 -0.03 0.04   -0.03 
Importance 
Att. 
                
0.01 0.04 
  
0.01 -0.03 0.04 
  
-0.03 
Others Same 
SN 
                
-0.07 0.04 
  
-0.06 -0.05 0.04 
  
-0.04 
Difficulty 
PBC 
                
0.14 0.04 
** 
0.12 0.12 0.05 
** 
0.10 
United States 
SN 
                
0.14 0.07 
* 
0.07 0.08 0.07 
  
0.04 
Business 
Regulation 
                        
-0.22 0.13 
  
-0.06 
Economy 
Dep. on Env. 
                        
0.03 0.04 
  
0.02 
Income 
Regulation 
                        
0.02 0.04 
  
0.02 
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Market Vs. 
Env. 
                        
-0.09 0.04 
* 
-0.09 
International 
Regulation 
                        
-0.11 0.05 
* 
-0.08 
Progress Vs. 
Env. 
                        
-0.09 0.04 
* 
-0.08 
Growth 
Harms Env. 
                        
-0.10 0.05 
  
-0.07 
Growth As 
Env. Solution 
                        
-0.08 0.04 
  
-0.06 
Lifestyle 
Harms Env. 
                        
-0.04 0.04 
  
-0.04 
Private Ent. 
Solutions 
                        
0.04 0.04 
  
0.03 
Adjusted R2 0.06       0.11       0.24       0.26     
  
F (df1, df2) 11.24 (5, 787) *** 17.10 (6, 786) *** 17.42 (15, 777) *** 12.39 (25, 767) *** 
ΔR2         0.05       0.14       0.04       
ΔR2 F 
(df1,df2)         43.36 (1, 786) *** 15.71 (9, 777) *** 
3.88 
(10, 767) *** 
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <.001 
 
Table 11 
Logistic Regression Results: Signing A Petition On An Environmental Issue (N = 789) 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Variable B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β 
Constant -5.04 0.60 *** 0.01 -5.61 0.64 *** 0.00 -6.61 0.73 *** 0.00 -5.29 1.11 *** 0.01 
Age 0.01 0.01   1.01 0.01 0.01   1.01 0.01 0.01   1.01 0.00 0.01   1.00 
Education 0.15 0.03 *** 1.17 0.15 0.03 *** 1.16 0.11 0.04 ** 1.12 0.11 0.04 ** 1.11 
Household 
Income 
0.02 0.02   1.02 0.02 0.02   1.02 0.02 0.02   1.02 0.01 0.02   1.01 
Sex -0.47 0.18 * 0.63 -0.48 0.18 ** 0.62 -0.59 0.19 ** 0.56 -0.61 0.20 ** 0.55 
Political 
Views 
0.36 0.06 *** 1.43 0.35 0.06 *** 1.42 0.26 0.07 *** 1.30 0.24 0.08 ** 1.27 
Environmental 
Intention         
0.30 0.11 ** 1.35 0.13 0.12   1.13 0.14 0.12   1.15 
GW Attitude                 0.04 0.10   1.04 0.02 0.11   1.02 
Env. Concern 
Att. 
                
0.13 0.12   1.14 0.11 0.12   1.12 
Env. Effects 
on Life SN 
                
0.33 0.10 ** 1.39 0.32 0.11 ** 1.37 
Env. Problems 
Exaggerated 
Att. 
                
0.04 0.11   1.04 0.00 0.11   1.00 
Lifestyle PBC                 0.10 0.11   1.11 0.09 0.11   1.09 
Importance 
Att. 
                
-0.18 0.11   0.83 -0.22 0.11   0.81 
Others Same 
SN 
                
0.11 0.11   1.11 0.11 0.11   1.11 
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Difficulty 
PBC 
                
0.22 0.12   1.24 0.16 0.12   1.17 
United States 
SN 
                
0.21 0.17   1.23 0.13 0.18   1.14 
Business 
Regulation 
                
        
-0.11 0.37   0.90 
Economy 
Dep. on Env. 
                        
0.03 0.10   1.03 
Income 
Regulation 
                        
-0.06 0.09   0.94 
Market Vs. 
Env. 
                        
0.00 0.11   1.00 
International 
Regulation 
                        
-0.19 0.13   0.83 
Progress Vs. 
Env. 
                        
-0.04 0.11   0.96 
Growth 
Harms Env. 
                        
0.29 0.13 * 1.34 
Growth As 
Env. Solution 
                        
-0.25 0.10 * 0.78 
Lifestyle 
Harms Env. 
                        
-0.07 0.10   0.94 
Private Ent. 
Solutions 
                        
-0.05 0.09   0.95 
Cox & Snell 
R2 
0.09       0.10       0.14       0.15       
Nagelkerke R2 0.14       0.15       0.21       0.24       
-2LL 771.58    763.14    726.67    712.85    
% Accuracy 
Classify 77.3    77.8    78.8    79.6    
Model χ2 
73.38 5.00   *** 81.83 6.00   *** 118.29 15.00   *** 
132.12 25.00 
  *** 
Block χ2 
- - - - 8.44 1.00   ** 36.47 9.00   *** 
13.83 10.00 
    
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <.001 
 
Table 12 
Logistic Regression Results: Donating Money For An Environmental Issue (N = 794) 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Variable B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β B SE   β 
Constant -5.51 0.61 *** 0.00 -6.33 0.66 *** 0.00 -8.40 0.81 *** 0.00 -7.80 1.19 *** 0.00 
Age 0.00 0.01   1.00 0.00 0.01   1.00 0.00 0.01   1.00 0.00 0.01   1.00 
Education 0.15 0.03 *** 1.16 0.14 0.04 *** 1.15 0.11 0.04 ** 1.11 0.10 0.04 * 1.10 
Household 
Income 
0.06 0.02 ** 1.06 0.06 0.02 ** 1.06 0.05 0.02 ** 1.06 0.05 0.02 ** 1.05 
Sex -0.08 0.18   0.92 -0.10 0.18   0.91 -0.27 0.20   0.77 -0.27 0.20   0.76 
Political 
Views 
0.33 0.06 *** 1.39 0.32 0.06 *** 1.37 0.14 0.07   1.15 0.13 0.08   1.14 
Environmental 
Intention         
0.42 0.11 *** 1.52 0.18 0.12   1.20 0.20 0.12   1.22 
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GW Attitude                 -0.01 0.11   0.99 -0.01 0.11   0.99 
Env. Concern 
Att. 
                
0.47 0.13 *** 1.60 0.47 0.13 *** 1.61 
Env. Effects 
on Life SN 
                
0.26 0.11 * 1.30 0.26 0.11 * 1.29 
Env. Problems 
Exaggerated 
Att. 
                
0.17 0.11   1.19 0.14 0.12   1.16 
Lifestyle PBC                 0.03 0.11   1.03 0.03 0.11   1.03 
Importance 
Att. 
                
-0.06 0.11   0.94 -0.07 0.11   0.94 
Others Same 
SN 
                
-0.08 0.11   0.92 -0.10 0.11   0.90 
Difficulty 
PBC 
                
0.35 0.12 ** 1.42 0.31 0.13 * 1.36 
United States 
SN 
                
0.41 0.19 * 1.50 0.36 0.19   1.43 
Business 
Regulation 
                
        
0.01 0.39   1.01 
Economy 
Dep. on Env. 
                        
-0.06 0.11   0.95 
Income 
Regulation 
                        
-0.06 0.09   0.94 
Market Vs. 
Env. 
                        
-0.09 0.11   0.92 
International 
Regulation 
                        
0.09 0.14   1.09 
Progress Vs. 
Env. 
                        
0.00 0.11   1.00 
Growth 
Harms Env. 
                        
0.17 0.13   1.18 
Growth As 
Env. Solution 
                        
-0.10 0.10   0.90 
Lifestyle 
Harms Env. 
                        
0.05 0.10   1.05 
Private Ent. 
Solutions 
                        
-0.02 0.09   0.98 
Cox & Snell 
R2 
0.09       0.11       0.18       0.19       
Nagelkerke R2 0.14       0.17       0.28       0.28       
-2LL 777.89    761.923    694.53    690.16    
% Accuracy 
Classify 77.5    78.5    80.4    80.6    
Model χ2 
76.98 5.00   *** 92.95 6.00   *** 160.34 15.00   *** 
164.71 25.00 
  *** 
Block χ2 
        15.96 1.00   *** 67.39 9.00   *** 
4.37 10.00 
    
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p <.001 
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Table 13 
Summary of Results: Support for Research Hypotheses by PEBs 
PEB Hypothesis 1: Is 
neoliberal ideology 
significant in 
explaining pro-
environmental 
behavior? 
Hypothesis 2: Do 
neoliberal indicators 
significantly affect 
pro-environmental 
behavior? 
Hypothesis 3: Does 
neoliberalism decrease 
the frequency or 
likelihood of pro-
environmental behavior? 
Driving Less Yes Yes Somewhat 
Water Reduction Yes Yes Yes 
Home Energy Use No No No 
Green Purchasing No No No 
Recycling No No No 
Higher Prices Yes Yes Yes 
Higher Taxes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard of Living Yes Yes Yes 
Signing Petition No Yes Somewhat 
Donating Money No No No 
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